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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines issues arising from the interaction of the cumulative legal avenues for 
protecting business and company names in New Zealand, and discusses various options for 
reform. 
Part II addresses current and potential conflicts arising from the concurrent application of 
passing off and s 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1986, as a means of demonstrating how the 
differing elements and policy priorities of the actions create complications for the substantive 
law and its development. Various options for addressing these problems are discussed. 
Part III discusses the overlap between the trade mark registration system, and the rights 
enforceable under passing off and s 9. While it is concluded that there is no conceptual 
overlap between the proprietary register and the rights enforced through litigation, as a result 
of the cumulative operation of the actions, rights to names which are unavailable through the 
trade mark system may be available through litigation. This has the potential to undermine 
the boundaries established by the trade mark legislation. In this context, the paper considers 
the impact of the proposed reforms on the trade mark regime, and whether a separate 
proprietary register for business names should be established as a means of rationalising the 
whole area of commercial name protection. 
Finally, Part IV considers firstly whether the present system of company name registration 
affords the most appropriate level of name protection to companies in comparison to the de 
facto protection given under the Companies Act 1955; and secondly, whether a similar 
register should be established for non-incorporated commercial entities both to benefit 
consumers and as a means of providing a complete register of prior rights to names in 
conjunction with the companies and trade mark registers. 
WORDLENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 15, 100 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Words or names are either part of a language, or in the case of invented words, may become 
part of a language, and so there is a judicial reluctance to give them rights of the scope 
conferred by copyright. To confer copyright protection over a word would have the effect of 
providing the copyright owner with a de facto monopoly over its use,1 and so it has been held 
that a word cannot be defined as an 'original literary work' so as to attract copyright 
protection.2 Just as the notion of a 'common stock of ideas' underpins copyright law,3 by 
analogy, words are similarly part of the "common heritage"4 of language. Therefore, there is a 
prima facie freedom to use words and names, which is restricted only "where public policy, as 
reflected in the law, dictates that the ill effects of such use outweigh the desire to allow 
unrestricted access to the language of the land. "5 
This prima facie freedom has been curtailed in the area of business and company name 
protection, where the public interest in the unrestricted access to words conflicts with 
commercial expectations and consumer interests in name protection. A name is a vital means 
of identifying and distinguishing a company or business and their goods or services. Often, 
significant resources are spent in the process of formulating a name, and once in use, the name 
can embody the goodwill or reputation of the commercial entity as a whole, becoming a key 
component of its financial success.6 Jeffries J7 has therefore commented in relation to 
companies that "in today's commercial world the name can be one of the most valuable assets 
a company has. Today's commercial answer to the famous question 'What's in a name?' is - a 
great deal." Consumers also have an important group interest in ensuring that names 
adequately distinguish entities in order to facilitate rational market decisions. So, although the 
public has an interest in protecting the common property of the language, there are also 
significant public interests in a system where commercial entities can protect the exclusivity of 
their name. 
1 In this paper it is acknowledged that the term 'monopoly' has a different meaning in an intellectual property 
context than in the competition law context. For a discussion of the term in each context, see Ministry of 
Commerce Review of Industrial Propeny Rights: Patents, Trademarks and Designs - Possible Options for 
Reform (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1990) 224. 
2 See Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] I Ch 119, 130. In a 
judgment upheld by the Court of Appeal, Graham J held that the word "Exxon" is not a literary work, as it 
affords neither instruction nor pleasure in the form of literary enjoyment. Graham J did not go on to hold that a 
word could never be the subject of copyright, but he noted at 131 that such a word "would have to have 
qualities or characteristics in itself, if such a thing is possible." 
3 See for example G Hammond "The Legal Protection of Ideas" 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 93. 
4 Clark Equipment Co v Registr_arofTrade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 , 514. 
5 N Francey Business Names Guide (3ed, CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney, 1985) 68. 
6 The commercial significance of names may be illustrated by the growth in litigation to protect names, and 
debate over the inclusion of trade marks and business names as assets in financial statements. See New Zealand 
Law Commission Intellectual Propeny: The Context for Reform -Repon no 13 (Wellington, I 990) 5. 
?crusader Oil NL v Crnsader Minerals NZ,Ltd (1984) 3 IPR 171 , 183. 
LAW LIBRA.RY 
YIGTORIA U, .1 v'ER.31 l Y OF WELLINGTON 
2 
In New Zealand, the protection of names from appropriation and the avoidance of confusingly 
similar names has been dealt with by a number of discrete yet cumulative heads of protection. 
Names used in business may be divided into three categories, i.e. company names, business 
names, and trade marks, and while a name may fit into all three, the level of protection given 
to a name differs according to the category the name falls within.s Business names cannot be 
registered, unless the entity is incorporated, or the name qualifies for the limited monopoly 
provided by trade mark registration under the Trade Marks Act 1953 ("TMA"); otherwise, 
passing off and s 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 ("FT A") must be relied on. Companies have 
the (albeit limited) protection of their name due to the fact that under the Companies Act 1993 
("1993 Act") no other company may register an identical or almost identical name. Also, 
company names may be eligible for trade mark registration, and the passing off and s 9 actions 
are likewise available. 
Two broad problems arise from the cumulative operation of the legal avenues of protection. 
Firstly, the policy imperatives of each discrete and developing area differ, creating a complex 
system of rights from the overlapping areas of protection between the actions. While the 
various policy considerations such as furthering competition, protecting traders' rights and 
providing consumer protection all directly or incidentally give some form of name protection, 
they are also potentially in conflict. Secondly, while there are both the companies and trade 
marks registers, there is no complete register of all prior rights, which may be based on actual 
use in trade pursuant to passing off or FT A actions. So, when selecting a name, there will be 
some risk of litigation, a risk which has increased for companies in the wake of the 1993 Act 
which placed the onus on applicants to ensure the absence of confusing similarity with another 
company name. 
Part II of this paper will focus the discussion on the conflicting policy priorities of s 9 and 
passing off which give rise to current and potential difficulties for the development of the 
substantive law. The challenge for the judiciary has been to balance the actions while still 
attempting to uphold the integrity of each. However, given the conflicting bases of each 
action, an important issue is whether the present ad hoe justification of individual decisions is 
the best way of dealing with the interaction of the two actions, or whether reform is required 
to find an overriding justification for the protection in their overlapping areas. While the trade 
mark regime has similar concerns of furthering the interests of both consumers and traders, 
the scope of the proprietary rights granted has implications for the substantive regime and its 
interaction with passing off and s 9. Part ill will discuss this overlap, and assess whether the 
law should be rationalised by the establishment of a proprietary register for business names. 
Part IV will consider whether the current system of company name reservation is the most 
appropriate from the perspective of name protection, and whether a similar register should be 
made available for non-incorporated entities with the object of providing a complete register of 
prior rights to names in conjunction with the companies and trade marks registers. 
8 P McCabe "A Smorgasbord of Intellectual Property and Other Intellectual Property Issues: Names in 
Business and the Business of Names" in 1993 NZ Law Conference Papers: Vol 2 169, 170. 
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II PASSING OFF AND SECTION 9 OF THE FTA 
A The Conflicting Policy Objectives 
I Passing off 
The 'classic' form of passing off arose to deal with situations whereby traders sold their 
goods under the intentional misrepresentation that they were goods of another trader.9 There 
was some early confusion regarding the rationale of passing off,10 however in A G 
Spalding11 lord Parker identified the basis to be the plaintiffs property right in the business 
or goodwill likely to be injured by a misrepresentation in trade. By basing passing off on the 
protection of goodwill as opposed to a name or mark as property in itself, the tort has 
consequently been able to expand from the originally narrow conception. 
To succeed in a passing off action, it is establishedl2 that the plaintiff must prove i) goodwill 
attached to their goods or services I 3 ii) a misrepresentation by the defendant, whether implied 
or intentional, that his or her services are those of the plaintiff or are associated with the 
plaintiff; 14 and iii) that as a result of the misrepresentation, damage has been or is likely to be 
suffered by the plaintiff. Passing off seeks to balance "the interest in free competition" with 
"the protection of a trader against unfair competition by others",15 and it is this concern which 
underpins the requirements of the tort.16 
9 Redd.away v Banham [1896JAC 199. 
10 In Redda.vay v &inham, above n 9, Lord Herschell stated that what was not protected was a proprietary right 
in the mark, name or get-up. But as Lord Diplock observed in Erven Wamink Besloten Vennootschap v 
Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979) AC 739, 740, the legal nature of the right was not identified, and so 
passing off remained an action sui generis for damage sustained by a misrepresentation of a certain kind. 
11 A G Spalding & Bros v A W Gamage Ltd ( 1915) 84 L J Ch 449, 450; approved in Star Industrial Co Ltd v 
Yap Kwee Kor [1976) FSR 256, 271 ; and Erven Wamink, above n 10. 
12Reckitt & Coleman Products Ltd v Bordemlnc [1990] 1 All ER 873,880 as per Lord Oliver. 
13 Goodwill is defined as "the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a 
business. It is the attractive force which brings in custom." Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co 's 
Margarine/Jd [1901] AC 217, 223-224; as per Lord Macnaghten. As personal property, the goodwill attached 
to a business may be assigned or otherwise dealt with, but the transfer of the goodwill is inseparable from the 
business; see C Wadlow The Law of Passing Off (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1990) 39. 
14 In the context of misleadingly similar name cases, this factor requires that the defendant has used the same or 
a deceptively similar name so as to confuse the relevant public; see Iheodorus Couwenberg & Son Ltd v 
Diesel Progress NZ Ltd (1988) 2 NZBLC 99-104. 
15 Dominion Rent A Car Ltd v Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd [1987) 2 NZLR 395,420; as per 
Somers J. 
16 The need to achieve a balance is also expressed in relation to passing off at the interim injunction level. In 
Advenising Works Ltd v Adworks Group Ltd Unreported, 28 October 1994, High Court, Christchurch, CP 
39/94, 3, Williamson J stated that injunctions should not be used "as a tool in the armoury of well-established 
business to prevent the legitimate commencement of competition." For a similar comment see Law line 
Telephone Consultations Limited v Integrative Dispute Resolution Limited Unreported, 21 August 1995, High 
Court, Wellington Registry, CP 185/95, 5. 
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Clearly, passing off primarily protects traders, as only traders can sue. However Lord Dip lock 
acknowledged in the Advocaat easel 7 that the tort also protects consumers against the 
confusion created when passing off occurs. Carty argues from this that informed market 
choices are a second goal of the tort.18 Indeed, the interests of the consumer may be upheld as 
a result of the operation of the tort. However as this Part will demonstrate, in the event of a 
conflict between adhering to the established principles of the action, or benefiting the 
consumer by preventing a lower threshold of conduct, on a strict application of the tort the 
higher threshold would prevail. It is these potentially conflicting interests which underpin the 
difficulties arising from the concurrent application of passing off and the Ff A. 
2 Section 9 of the FTA 
Section 9 of the Ff A provides that "[n]o person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is 
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. "19 In contrast to passing off, s 9 is 
primarily based on the view that the consuming public has a right not to be misled about with 
whom they are dealing.20 The freedom of the consumer to make their own decisions in the 
marketplace is "at the heart of competition theory",21 and so the Ff A aims to support the 
consumer in their role as decision maker by promoting informed choice.22 
However, the interests of "ethical traders"23 who are affected by deceptive conduct are 
recognised by allowing them to bring actions under the Ff A. As a result, s 9 may be used as a 
cumulative remedy in the circumstances analogous to passing off. While "it might be thought 
ironic that an Act to make trade and commerce more competitive might be used to protect the 
monopoly in a name",24 the Ff A is concerned to protect the consuming public, and granting 
rights to names is incidental to that fundamental goal. 
As a result of the competing policy priorities of s 9 and passing off, the interaction of the two 
actions is problematic, as judges seek to uphold the objectives of each action in situations 
where often both cannot be accommodated. For s 9, this has meant, for example, that in 
relation to descriptive and geographic names, consumer interests in regulating misleading 
conduct have been overridden by the wider public interest in the general availability of words 
that other traders may reasonably wish to use. On the other hand, s 9 has substantive 
17 Erven Waminkabove n 10, 742. 
18 H Carty "Passing Off and the Concept of Goodwill" [1995] JBL 139, 152. 
19 Section 9 of the FI'A is derived from s 52 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 ("TPA"). 
20 See Taylor Bros Ltd v Taylors Group Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 33. 
21 P J Kaufmann Passing Off and Misappropriation (Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, 
Copyright and Competition Law, Munich, 1986) 27. 
22 See Hon Margaret Shields (1985) 467 NZPD 7885. 
23 Hon Margaret Austin ( 1985) 467 NZPD 7896. 
24 Equity Access Pry Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) 16 IPR 431 , 439; as per Hill Jin the Federal 
Court of Australia. This comment was made in relation to Part V of the TP A, upon which the FT A is based. 
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implications for passing off, as will be discussed with reference to the principles relating to the 
concurrent use of names, the existence of the 'own name' defence, and the challenge to the 
goodwill requirement of passing off. As a result of these conflicts, there is an level of 
uncertainty in the application and development of the overlapping areas. 
B Importation of Passing Off Principles into Section 9 
1 General principles 
Due to the potentially conflicting policy objectives of each action, it has been observed in 
relation to s 52 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 ("TPA ") that passing off principles 
will not be a safe guide in determining a statutory breach.25 Nevertheless, passing off and the 
statutory action do have common elements. 
For example, in establishing misrepresentation by the defendant in passing off and misleading 
or deceptive conduct for s 9, there is a requirement that the defendant's actions have confused 
or deceived or are likely to confuse or deceive a significant number of consumers into thinking 
that the defendant's goods or services are those of the plaintiff, or at least are associated.26 A 
lower threshold test for s 9 based on the 'cause to wonder' test in trademark law has been 
rejected.27 It is neither necessary or sufficient to show fraud or the intention to cause 
confusion,28 although it is of evidentiary advantage to the plaintiff for both actions if they can 
be established.29 Similarly, actual instances of confusion are relevant but not conclusive.30 A 
common field of activity between the plaintiff and the defendant is not required for passing 
25 Hornsby Building Information Centre Pry Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd ( 1978) 18 ALR 
639, 646. 
26 See for example Homs by, above n 25; Taco Bell Pry Ltd v Taco Company of Australia Inc (1982) A TPR 
40-277. 
27 Above n 20, 39, applying Parko.ale Custom Built Furniture Pry Ltd v Puxu Pry Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191. 
However the line is a fine one, for example if some consumers wonder, the court may conclude that others are 
likely to be misled. 
28 Millington v Fox (1838) 3 My & Cr 338, 40 ER 956, as per Lord Cottenham. For the application of this 
principle to s 9, see for example Magellan Corporation Limited v Magellan Group Limited (1995) 5 NZBLC 
99-354. 
29 A finding that a respondent has used a name or get up with the intention of appropriating the appellant's 
reputation will allow the court to readily infer that the name in question is distinctive of the plaintiffs business 
or product; see for example Telemak Teleproducts (Australia) Pry Ltd v Coles Myer Ltd (1988) 12 IPR 297 . 
See also Central Equity Ltd v Central Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 48 I , 485. 
30For example see Hornsby, above n 25 , where the defendant's conduct was held not to be misleading despite 
some evidence of the public being actually deceived. 
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off, despite earlier indications to the contrary.31 McGechan Jin Taylor Bros32 stated that "the 
existence or otherwise of a common field of activity is merely one pointer towards the 
probable presence or absence of confusion." So, if the business of the plaintiff and the 
defendant are in totally unrelated fields, the likelihood of confusion is diminished. This 
position is consistent with that for s 9. 
2 Descriptive and geographic names 
A central concern in the area of name protection is to restrict the rights conferred on traders to 
words which other traders cannot reasonably expect to use. This principle was recently 
expressed in XS Radio,33 where Thomas J noted that to 
grant a plaintiff a monopoly in the use of [descriptive] words is clearly inappropriate. Nor in today's 
economic climate, is it desirable to restrict competition by permitting words in common usage to be 
appropriated by a particular entrepreneur. 
Passing off therefore attempts to draw a line between legitimate and illegitimate uses of words 
by providing that descriptive or geographic names are not prima facie protectable, unless 
secondary association built up through actual trading can be proven to identify the words 
solely with the plaintiff.34 The burden of proof on the plaintiff will be much higher than in 
other cases, and the court will accept small differences between the competing names as 
adequate to avoid passing off.35 
The principle relating to descriptive and geographic names has been imported into s 9 on the 
basis that s 9 would otherwise be a source of a newly created monopoly, consequently 
creating entry barriers to competition.36 It is submitted that this result is appropriate, given that 
the objective of the Ff A is to deal with undesirable business practices which can stem from a 
competitive marketplace, and to act as a counterpoise to the Commerce Act, which aims to 
31 For an example of the earlier approach requiring similar fields of activity, see New 'Zealand Insurance 
Company Limited v New 'Zealand Insurance Brokers l..Jd [ 1976] 2 NZLR 40. For an example of the current 
approach, see Exxon, above n 2, where an injunction was granted despite the absence of a common field of 
activity. 
32 Above n 20, 20. (High Court) 
33 XS Radio Limited v Radio New 'Zealand Limited (1994) 5 NZBLC 99-331 , 103-477. 
34 See the leading case of Office Cleaning Services Ltd v Westminster Window and General Cleaners Ltd ( 1946) 
63 RPC 39. For New Zealand examples see National Timber Co Ltd v National Hardware, Timber and 
Machinery Co l..Jd [1923] NZLR 1258; Theodorus, above n 14; Crusader Oil, above n 7; Lawline Telephone, 
above n 16; Advenising Worlcr , above n 16. 
35 In Equity Access, above n 24: 448, Hill J described an evidentiary continuum with purely descriptive names 
at one end and completely invented names at the other. The further along the continuum to invented names, the 
easier it is for the plaintiff to establish that the words describe the plaintiff's business only; applied in 
Cardmember Wines Ltd v The Wine Society Ltd (1992) 4 NZBLC 99-248. 
36 Above n 25, 649. 
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foster competition in business activity.37 
It is interesting, however, to analyse the reasoning employed to align the rule with the 
rationale of s 9. It may be observed that the dominant policy objective of s 9 has been 
overridden in these cases by the wider public interest in keeping descriptive words in the 
public domain.38 However in Homsby39it was stated that if a name is no more than 
descriptive of a particular type of business, "its use by others who carry on the same type of 
business does not deceive or mislead as to the nature of the business described." It is then 
noted that any deception which does arise is not deception aimed at by the statutory provision, 
implicitly, because of the wider public policy. So while the possibility of confusion may be 
present, when names consist of descriptive words this risk "must be accepted. "40 
Arguably, a strict application of the statutory provision would find a breach when two names 
are confusingly similar regardless of the nature of the words. However the way the courts 
have dealt with this issue serves to demonstrate that as judges are constrained by the 
conflicting policy objectives, artificial reasoning must be employed to reach the desired result. 
In the area of descriptive and geographic names, the integrity of each action has explicitly been 
upheld, yet implicitly the policy of s 9 has been overridden. 
C Conflicts Between Section 9 and Passing Off 
1 Concurrent use 
There has been much speculation as to whether passing off can survive in the wake of s 9, due 
to differences such as the absence of a requirement of damage for injunctions under the 
Ff A. 41 Passing off has not been rendered obsolete by its damage requirement, 42 however 
there are a number of areas where the different policy priorities of s 9 will challenge passing 
off in its present form. One such area where s 9 may have an impact is concurrent use. 
37 R D Mulholland Business Law Today ( 4ed, The Dunmore Press Ltd, Palmerston North, 1995) 463. 
38 The importation of passing off principles is criticised by Blakeney as illustrating laissez faire concerns 
inappropriate for consumer legislation; M Blakeney "Old Wine in New Bottles: The Influence of the Common 
Law on the Interpretation of Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act" (1984) 58 ALl 316, 317. 
39 Above n 25,648. 
40 Above n 39. 
41 Section 41 of the Ff A. For example, Cooke P stated in Taylor Bros that "it is to be expected that, as has 
apparently happened in Australia, to a large extent proceedings under the [Fair Trading] Act will replace in this 
country actions for passing off at common law." Above n 20, 38. See also A Brown "Current Developments in 
Passing Off and Fair Trading in New Zealand with Particular Reference to the Australian Connection" [1988] 
EIPR 302. 
42 Recent cases have held that some materially detrimental effect on consumers is required for an injunction 
under the Ff A and so seeking an injunction under s 9 is not without difficulty; see Tot Toys v Mitchell [1993] 
1 NZLR 325, 371; Radio New 'Zealand Limited v C93FM (Christchurch) Limited Unreported, 30 September 
1994, High Court, Christchurch Registry, CP 137 /94; Radio New 'Zealand Limited v C93FM (Christchurch) 
Limited Unreported, 7 December 1994, Court of Appeal, CA 205/94. 
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In passing off, if one party can establish exclusive goodwill in a name, the court may grant 
them sole rights to use the name. If two parties have honestly acquired goodwill in a single 
name, it is possible for each to hold rights to the name concurrently with the other party, 
enabling each to take action against a third party.43 In these situations the court may allow the 
concurrent use of the similar names despite some confusion of the public, 44 demonstrating the 
importance placed by the courts on a trader's proprietary right in their goodwill. 
A recent s 9 case with potentially significant ramifications for the concurrent use of names is 
Magellan Corp Ltd v Magellan Group Ltd. 45 The plaintiff companies, Magellan Corporation 
("Corporation"), were involved in the commercial and property industry. They had traded 
since 1984, but were relatively inactive between 1988 and 1992 due to financial difficulties.46 
In 1992, the first defendant entered the property industry under the name Magellan Group 
("Group"). Corporation lodged an objection with the Registrar of Companies, but it was 
declined. Two years after that decision, Corporation applied for an injunction, relying solely 
ons 9 of the FTA on the basis that Group had misled consumers by relying on Magellan for 
primary identification. Group counterclaimed. 4 7 The central legal issue was whether the fact 
that Corporation was the first to acquire a reputation in the name Magellan gave it a prior right 
to use the name. 
In the High Court, Fisher J held that Corporation had established a reputation in the minds of 
a significant number of people within the relevant market, and Group's use was inherently 
likely to confuse consumers and had done so in fact. Significantly, however, it was held that 
Corporation's conduct was also causing confusion because Corporation had, by delay, 
enabled Group to build up a reputation of its own. The fact that Corporation had been the first 
to establish reputation was no defence to the Ff A.48 
In assessing the remedy, Fisher J considered that although both Corporation and Group had 
established reputations in the name Magellan, the status quo was misleading in terms of s 9, 
yet to restrain one party would be equally misleading. It was therefore held that consumer 
interests would be served by a name change, and the unusual order was made restraining the 
use of the name Magellan by each company unless modified by immediately preceding or 
43 See for example Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar NP [1984] FSR 413; see also Habib Bank Ltd v 
Habib Bank AG 'Zurich [1982] RPC 1. For a general discussion of concurrent rights see Wadlow, above n 13, 
412. 
44 For example, in Dominion Rent A Car, above n 15, the Court of Appeal approved the use by two car hire 
companies of the name "Budget" despite public confusion. 
45 Above n 28. 
46 Although relatively inactive~ Corporation still owned and managed a number of properties between 1988 and 
1992, and in March it signed a conditional agreement to purchase a property in Newmarket, Auckland. 
47 Group argued that there was no confusion, but if Group was in breach, the court should take into account 
Corporation' s delay in bringing an action, and that Group had built up a stronger reputation than Corporation 
had. Alternatively Group argued that Corporation was also causing confusion. 
48 Above n 28, 103-863. 
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following the name Magellan by another word recognisable as a person's surname. 49 
The approach adopted in Magellan was a direct response to the policy imperative of s 9. The 
conclusion reached by Fisher J would undoubtedly have had a different conclusion if the case 
been decided under passing off. If the focus had instead been on the proprietary rights in 
goodwill, either a concurrent rights approach could have been adopted, or rights could have 
been conferred on one party at the expense of the other. Yet both these approaches were 
precluded in Magellan, on the basis that rather than functioning to confer rights in a name, the 
Ff A "has the wholly different purpose of preventing deception of the public whatever the 
historical causes of the deception. "50 Therefore, if in any given district consumers are being 
misled by competing names, both parties using the name at the given time may be breaching 
the Act and will be restrained from using their unmodified name.s 1 
If the approach in Magellan is indeed followed in future cases, it may be crucial for prior users 
of names to take immediate action against a competing user to prevent them building up a 
reputation in the name. The case also has implications for the tolerance of concurrent rights 
under passing off. As the action was brought under s 9, the Judge was not required to 
articulate and weigh the policy priorities of s 9 and passing off, and so what remains to be 
seen is whether similar facts brought pursuant to both actions concurrently would produce a 
similar result. As will be discussed, the answer may depend on whether consumer interests 
are held to justify the erosion of the traditional boundaries of protection established within the 
passing off action. 
2 'Own name' defence 
Another area within passing off which may potentially be affected by the differing policy 
priorities of s 9 is the somewhat uncertain exception to passing off regarding the use of one's 
own name in business. The original justification for the defence, arising when fraudulent 
intent was an ingredient of passing off, was that the legitimate use by a trader of their own 
name could not be fraudulent.52 Underpinning this seems to have been the notion that 
49 The order was unusual as Judges rarely suggest alternative names due to a difficulty of ascertaining in 
advance what is likely to be confusing or not. See for example Brittain Publishing Co (London) Ltd v Trade & 
Commercial Press (1957) RPC 134; followed in Noel Leeming Television Ltd v Noel 's Appliance Centre Ltd 
(1985) 5 IPR 249. The Court of Appeal has since confirmed a joint memorandum of the parties varying the 
order of the High Court. The revised orders restrain Group from using the name Magellan in respect of any 
New Zealand activities, and restrain Corporation from using the name Magellan for three years except in 
relation to specified projects; Magellan Corporation Limited v Magellan Group Limited Umeported, 21 June 
1996, Court of Appeal, CA 202_/95. 
50 Above n 48. 
51 Above n28, 103-864. It was noted however that if the prior user had no knowledge of the competing use, 
the lack of knowledge may be taken into account in assessing the remedy. 
52 Hals bury 's Laws of England, ( 4ed, Butterworths, London, 1995) vol 48, Trade Marks and Trade Names, 
130. 
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... a man must be allowed to trade in his own name and, if some confusion results, that is a lesser evil 
than that a man should be deprived of what would appear to be a natural and inherent right.53 
However, this view has altered. The right is now perceived as something less than absolute, 
and indeed there are doubts as to whether the defence exists.54 Yet if it does exist, it is settled 
that an intention to appropriate the plaintiffs goodwill will vitiate the right, and the right 
cannot be relied on to mark goods if confusion results.55 Beyond this, its precise scope is 
unclear, as what is lacking is "a decision unequivocally allowing an honest defendant to go on 
making use of his own name though acknowledging that deception and damage will result".56 
In New Zealand, the defence arguably does exist, but the issue remains as to what form it 
takes. Somers J57 has acknowledged the difficulties in justifying the exception, but concluded 
that the exception is too established to be ignored. Three limitations were established.58 The 
name in question must be the actual name of the defendant;59 it must not extend to the use of 
the name if it will deceive (as opposed to causing confusion); and, while extending to 
companies with an established business, it does not extend to new companies.60 
The precise scope of such a defence or indeed whether an exception exists may be determined 
bys 9. There have been no conclusive decisions in New Zealand as to the effect of s 9 on the 
issue. Given, however, the consumer bias of the statutory provision, it may be speculated that 
53 Marengo v Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd ( 1948) 65 RPC 242, 251; as per Lord Simonds [ emphasis 
added]. In Tunon v Tunon (1889) 42 Ch D, Lord Esher MR's view was that it would be unjust to prevent 
someone using their own name in connection with their business just because the public might confuse their 
business with that of someone else. See also Burgess v Burgess (1853) 43 ER 351 , 354. 
54 For example, Wadlow notes that there is no longer the distinction between fraudulent intent and honest use 
which initially justified the defence; and a number of decisions indicate that an exception does not exist; above 
n 13, 403. See for example Massam v Thorley 's Cattle Food Co (1880) 14 Ch D 748, 760 where it was held 
that a newcomer may only use their own name if it would not cause confusion with an established business of 
the same name. 
55 Joseph & Son Ltd v W N Rodgers & Co (1924) 41 RPC 277. The latter was approved in Parker Knoll Ltd 
v Knoll International Ltd [1982] RPC 265 by Lord Monis at 279, and Lord Hodson at 284. See also Jamieson 
& Co v Jamieson (1898) 15 RPC 169; and Teofani & Co Ltd v Teofani (1913) 2 Ch 545. 
56 Above n 13,403. 
57 NZ, Farmers Co-operative Assn of Canterbury Ltd v Farmers Trading Co Ltd (1979) 1 NZIPR 212. 
58 These three points are derived from McGechan J's summary of the decision in Taylor Bros, above n 20, 22. 
59 For example, the name must be without abbreviations. This factor was adopted as the test by Salmond J in 
JJ Craig Ltd v EA & H R Craig [1922] NZLR 199; and followed by the Court of Appeal in Cooper v Frost 
[1937] NZLR 1071. 
60 In the Court of Appeal in Taylor Bras, Cooke P dismissed the application of the defence on the facts, on 
the basis that it cannot be relied on by a company which starts business in a new area using an adaption of its 
registered name which misleads customers into assuming that it is associated with an established company; 
above n 20, 38. 
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either the defence may be held not to exist, or would have stricter limitations imposed on it.61 
For example, the already controversial application to companies may be decisively negated by 
s 9. Ultimately, the conclusion must again depend upon which policy objective is seen as 
having priority, for if the 'inherent right' to use one's own name is seen by the courts as 
overriding the concern of avoiding confusion of the public, consumers' interests would have 
to be subsumed within the wider public interest as the courts have done for descriptive names. 
Conversely, if the primary concern of s 9 is placed in priority, the right to honestly use one's 
own name in connection with trade would thereby be threatened. 
D Challenges to Goodwill 
1 'Spill-over' reputation 
Due to the internationalisation of trade, business, advertising, travel, and the development of 
technology and communication, the issue has arisen as to what extent an overseas plaintiff can 
prevent others using its name or mark within a jurisdiction into which it has not yet expanded 
its operations. Due to the globalisation of reputation, there is increasing potential for situations 
where it would be inequitable to allow traders to use names similar or identical to those used 
by overseas traders. 
Passing off has traditionally required some actual business activity by the plaintiff within the 
local jurisdiction, on the basis that if there is no customer connection in the jurisdiction, there 
could be no goodwill to damage.62 This proposition is commonly derived from Lord 
Diplock's statement in Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor63 that 
[g]oodwill, as the subject of proprietary rights, is incapable of subsisting by itself. It has no 
independent existence apart from the business to which it is attached. It is local in character and 
divisible; if the business is carried on in several countries a separate goodwill attaches to it in each. 
In Dominion Rent A Car, 64 the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised that goodwill can 
transcend territorial boundaries, but it affirmed that "some form of business connection is 
generally thought to be necessary. "65 Cooke P was reluctant to define the business connection 
61 In Gollel Holdings Pty Ltd v Kenneth Maurer Funerals Pty Ltd (1987) 9 IPR 109, Einfeld Jin the Federal 
Court of Australia held that a person has no absolute right to use his or her own name in the advertising of 
goods or services, and that proper distinguishing words must be used. The comment was made at 120 that 
"there is no difference between a man's use of his name or his use of some other appellation in considering 
deceptive conduct." As the case solely concerned the TPA, this would seem to hint towards a stricter threshold. 
62 See for example Athletes Foot Marketing Associates v Cobra Spons Ltd [1980] RPC 343; see also 
Anheuser-Busch Inc, above n 43. 
63 Above n 11 . 
64 Above n 15, 406. 
65 Above n 15, 405 ; as per Cooke P. 
12 
required, but Somers J recognised that "[i]n such cases the reputation may be almost 
tantamount to goodwill, activity having importance in localising that reputation in New 
Zealand."66 Although constrained by the requirement of goodwill, recent New Zealand cases 
have held the overseas plaintiff to have a sufficient business connection in New Zealand 
despite slight activity, thus straining the concept of business connection in the desire to meet 
the justice of the case. For example, in Midas, 67 Eichelbaum J held that although the plaintiff 
company from the United States had not traded in New Zealand, its reputation in New Zealand 
coupled with their negotiations for New Zealand franchises were sufficient to allow 
protection.68 
Until recently Australian courts inclined to the traditional approach,69 although there had been 
some uncertainty about the requirement of business activity within the jurisdiction.70 
However the Federal Court recently lowered the threshold in ConAgra, 11 holding that 
business activity within the jurisdiction is not required and instead the test is whether a 
"sufficient reputation" has been established in the jurisdiction "in order to acquire a sufficient 
level of consumer knowledge of the product and attraction for it to provide custom which, if 
lost, would be likely to result in damage ... "72 Underpinning the case is the notion that passing 
off should be based primarily on the misappropriation of reputation. 73 Lockhart J stated that it 
is problematic to focus on the "artificial concept" of goodwill,74 as definitions of goodwill 
requiring a customer connection have been derived from revenue cases,75 and in the passing 
off context, "goodwill was not meant to have a different meaning to reputation". 
66 Above n 15, 420. 
67MuJas International Corporation v Midas Autocare Ltd (1988) 2 NZBLC 99-101. 
68 This decision is illuminated by Eichelbaum' s comment that in the light of the communication explosion, 
an even less demanding approach would be attractive, above n 67, 109-919. For further demonstrations of the 
strained applications of the concept of business activity, see Crusader Oil, above n 7; Granny Mays 
Management Pty Ltd v Whitcoulls Group Ltd ( 1993) 4 NZBLC 99-294; Esanda Ltd v Esanda Finance Ltd 
[1984] 2 NZLR 748. 
69 See for example Taco Bell, above n 26. 
70 For example, Powell J in the New South Wales decision of Fletcher Challenge Ltd v Fletcher Challenge 
Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 196, 205 ordered an interim injunction in favour of the New Zealand plaintiff 
company restraining passing off by the defendant, ruling that the plaintiff did not have to operate in Australia, 
and its localised reputation was sufficient. 
71 ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302. 
72 Above n 71,343. A substantial amount of people, whether resident or visitors, must be aware of the 
plaintiff's product, and it was on this ground that the action failed in ConAgra; above n 71 , 346. Reputation 
may be proven by a variety of means including advertising, regardless of the country of origin, and travel. 
73 Above n 71,342. 
74 Above n 71, 343. 
75 Above n 71 , 340. For example, the leading case of Muller, above n 13, concerned the Stamp Act in the 
United Kingdom. 
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Although some fonn of damage is still required,76 by removing the customer connection as a 
requirement of goodwill, the case has widened the scope of the action considerably, focusing 
instead on the 'unfair' conduct of the defendant. 77 While the need to encourage local 
innovation is acknowledged, international competition has become more restricted within this 
approach, as local enterprises cannot freely appropriate the name of a sufficiently well known 
overseas business which does not, however, trade within the local jurisdiction. 
It remains to be seen whether New Zealand courts will follow this approach. Given the 
judicial recognition of the developing trading relationship of New Zealand and Australia, and 
particularly in light of the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (" ANZ-CERT A "),78 
it would not be unlikely. The operation of ANZ-CERTA creates the reasonable expectation of 
an aligned threshold in the protection of business and trading names in both New Zealand and 
Australia, as has indeed been hinted at by the courts.79 
The impact of s 9 on the area of 'spill-over reputation' is yet to be conclusively addressed, yet 
it is arguable that it may provide the impetus for a lowered threshold in the area, as the plaintiff 
in a s 9 action only needs to prove reputation in the name. While there must be some 
recognition of the name in the market "against which the notion of misleading or deceptive 
conduct can be measured,"80 the threshold is lower than that for goodwill.81 Thus, in 
ConAgra, s 52 of the TP A and passing off moved closer together as 'goodwill' merged with 
the lower standard of reputation.82 
In New Zealand, Gault J83 has commented that a trading presence may not be required for s 9, 
because it is directed to "the avoidance of public deception" and so "fine distinctions which 
might allow conduct of that nature to continue unimpeded will be discouraged." While the 
76Jt seems that the overseas plaintiff must have some intention to establish their business or sell their goods 
in the jurisdiction; above n 7 4. For a discussion of the damage requirement in this context, see F Martin 
"Protection of International Business Reputation in Australia" (1993) 21 Aust Bus Rev 317, 332. 
77 Carty, above n 18, 139. 
78 The Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement came into force on 1 January 
1983. 
79 See for example Crusader Oil, above n 7, 181 where Jeffris J noted that the New Zealand and Australian 
courts should apply the principles in this area in light of ANZ- CERT A. Similarly, Cooke Pin Dominion 
Rent A Car, above n 15,407 stated that ANZ-CERT A provided a background "which should influence the 
development of the common law in Australasia." 
80 IJairy Value Metro Co-operative Ltd v Brownes Dairy Ltd (1981) 54 FLR 243. 
81 See for example Elders /XL Ltd v Australian Estates Pty Ltd (1987) 10 IPR 575. 
82 Martin notes, however, that how close the actions are is unclear due to indications that there is a lower 
threshold in determining the nature or number of relevant persons likely to be misled under s 52 as opposed to 
the substantial number required for passing off; above n 76, 330. 
83 Joico Laboratories Inc v Beauty Products Co Ltd ( 1990) 4 TCLR 48, 53. 
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'cause to wonder' test for public deception under s 16 of the TMA84 is inapplicable to s 9,85 
its relevance to the interpretation of s 9 in this context has not yet been ruled upon.86 The 
Court of Appeal has held that in determining whether the public has been or would be 
deceived by the registration of a trade mark due to its similarity to an overseas mark, the test is 
that of awareness by the public of the overseas mark. 87 Due to the consumer oriented focus of 
both sections, it is arguable that the test for s 16 should be applied, in which case business 
activity in New Zealand would not be required for s 9.88 
2 Pre-launch publicity 
In establishing goodwill, the longer a name is used, the easier it will be to prove goodwill, 
although in exceptional cases it may be established within a relatively short time.89 There are 
indications that where there is significant pre-launch publicity establishing a plaintiffs 
reputation before their business is fully established, the courts may implicitly require only 
reputation.90 Although a customer connection has not strictly been established before a 
business is launched, Carty notes that courts in the United Kingdom have not ruled out the 
possibility that goodwill may be established in these circumstances.91 
Thus, it may be observed that in these circumstances, the concept of goodwill has been 
strained to meet the perceived justice of the case, as demand created through reputation 
replaces the traditional requirement for customer connection. It may be speculated that s 9 will 
also accelerate the challenge to goodwill in this area, as a plaintiff may be able to rely on s 9 in 
situations where consumers are misled by the appropriation and use of names which through 
pre-launch publicity are associated with another trader. If passing off could not likewise 
84 Section 16 provides that it is not lawful to register as a trade mark any scandalous matter, any matter which 
would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, or would be contrary to law or morality, or would otherwise be 
disentitled to protection in court. Toe leading case ons 16 is Pioneer Hi-Bred Com Company v Hy-Line 
Chicks Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR SO. 
85 Above n 27. 
86 In Midas, above n 67, the plaintiff argued that only reputation is needed for s 9 in light of s 16, although 
the Judge did not form an opinion on the argument. 
87 Pioneer, above n 84, 70; as per Richardson J. 
88 Morgan argues that s 16, as interpreted in Pioneer, is persuasive of the proposition that reputation is all that 
is required to support a s 9 action; 0 Morgan "Local Business Connection: Passing Off and Section 9 of the 
Fair Trading Act" (1995) 1(2) NZIPJ 28, 33. 
89 This will be especially so where the market is geographically limited, or the product has specialist appeal. 
See S Ricketson The Law of Intellectual Propeny (Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1984) 539. See for example 
Fletcher Challenge, above n 70, where Powell J held that a new reputation had been created by the New Zealand 
company within hours of its formation, as its amalgamation had been announced amid considerable news 
converage. 
90 See generally Carty, above n 18, 146; see also Ricketson, above n 89,538. 
91 Carty, above n 18, 146. See for example BBC v Talbot [1981] FSR 228, whereMegarry VC granted an 
interlocutory injunction to a plaintiff to restrain the defendant using the name CARF AX for a traffic 
information system on the basis of extensive pre-launch publicity. In Elida Gibbs v Colgate-Palmolive [1983] 
FSR 95, Goulding J similarly granted an injunction to the plaintiff on the basis of a marketing campaign. 
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provide protection, it could become obsolete in these areas. 
E The Future of Passing Off 
1 Two conceptual difficu/Jies 
The preceding discussion has highlighted areas where the current formulation of passing off is 
being, or potentially could be, challenged by s 9. The issues may be divided into two 
conceptual difficulties. Firstly, passing off directly conflicts with s 9 in areas such as 
concurrent use, and potentially in the application of an 'own name' defence. This directly 
results from the differing policy priorities of the two actions. The second conceptual difficulty 
is that in the areas of spill-over reputation and pre-launch publicity the traditionally applied 
conception of goodwill is being strained to meet situations where there is a perceived need for 
protection, which the lower threshold of 9 may otherwise be able to provide. 
It is conceivable that judicial decision making may continue ad hoe in the area without having 
to explicitly address these conceptual difficulties. In situations where the two actions directly 
conflict, cases may continue to be decided in ways which require the employment of 
somewhat strained reasoning to ostensibly uphold each action. Also, as long as factual 
situations are able to accommodate some customer connection, decisions may be re.ached 
while keeping the separate actions intact and thus maintaining the goodwill component of 
passing off. However, the issue arises as to whether the ad hoe justification of individual 
decisions is the best way of dealing with the conflicts, or whether reform is desirable. 
2 Misappropriation tort? 
One option is to replace both passing off and s 9 with either a general tort of 
'rnisappropriation'92 or legislation creating a general prohibition against 'unfair trading'.93 
The uncertainty arising from the conflicts between the differing policy priorities would not be 
removed. However, by replacing the two separate actions with one overarching principle 
focusing generally on the "misappropriation of valuable intangibles",94 there would be scope 
for more unrestricted judicial decision making, as artificial reasoning would not need to be 
employed to align the conflicting policies. 
To date there has been a judicial reluctance in the Commonwealth courts to introduce a single 
92 See for example A Teny "Misappropriation of a Competitor's Trade Values" ( 1988) S 1 Mod LR 296; see 
also Ricketson "Reaping Without Sowing: Unfair Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo-
Australian Law" [1984] UNSWU 1. 
93 See for example C Elliott "Unfair Competition and Sui Generis Legislation - An Urgent Need For Reform" 
(1992) 3 AIPJ 31. 
94 M Spence "Passing Off and the Misappropriation of Valuable Intangibles" (1996) 112 LQR 472. 
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'umbrella' action,95 as it is feared that to allow such a wide action would be to tilt the balance 
of the law in the area "too far away from encouraging competition. "96 The Australian High 
Court has rejected a general action of unfair competition in Moorgate, 97 on the basis that such 
an action would be inconsistent with "the established limits of the traditional and statutory 
causes of action" which "define the boundary between the area of legal or equitable restraint 
and protection and the area of untrammelled competition ... "9 8 However, the merits of a 
misappropriation tort continue to be debated. The dominant justifications cited in favour of 
such a tort seem to be based either on perceptions that current intellectual property mechanisms 
are incapable of providing protection to expanding areas without having to artificially strain the 
existing action,99 or a perceived need to give protection to valuable intangibles where none is 
presently available.I oo 
Whether or not an 'umbrella' tort is justified to deal with expanding areas of intellectual 
property such as character merchandising is beyond the scope of this paper. However from 
the perspective of business name protection, the problem is not the scope of protection 
available, especially with the relaxation of the requirement for common activity. Furthermore, 
the current law applies a number of important thresholds, such as the public interest principle 
relating to descriptive names. Although judges would probably be reluctant to lower the 
threshold, it could not be guaranteed that it would be maintained by a wide tort based on 
misappropriation. It could also potentially lead to further complexities in the interaction with 
the 1MA, which would be especially problematic in light of the imminent reforms to the trade 
mark system. Due to these considerations, it is submitted that enabling less restricted judicial 
reasoning as a policy objective does not justify the imposition of a general tort, and it is 
desirable to deal with the issue within the broad framework of the present law. 
3 Conflicts with section 9 
In situations where traders' rights directly conflict with consumers' interests, one option 
would be to explicitly prioritise traders' interests. For example, applying this approach, 
Magellan should not be followed in the area of concurrent use where both actions are argued. 
Consumer interests would not be disregarded when assessing the relative rights of the parties, 
95 See for example Mogul Steamship v McGregor & Gow (1889) 28 QBD 598; see also Cadbury Schweppes 
Pty Ltd v Pub Squash Co Pry Ltd [1981] RPC 429. 
96Above n 18, 151. See also WR Cornish Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied 
Rights (2ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1989) 424. 
97 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd and Another (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414. 
98 Above n 97, 445; as per Deane J. 
99 See for example Terry, above n 92, 320. Terry points to character merchandising cases to demonstrate that 
cases are actually decided on 'misappropriation' grounds while strained to fit within the requirement of 
misrepresentation and therefore the current protection is inadequate. See also Elliot, above n 93, who argues 
that a new action should replace copyright's role in protecting utilitarian works. 
100 For example, Spence assumes that a misappropriation tort would not cover valuable intangibles currently 
protected. Above n 94,477. 
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but would instead be one consideration among many. In cases where both parties are able to 
establish goodwill, the court may be reluctant to grant concurrent rights where consumer 
deception is in evidence, however where some public confusion is likely or evidenced, the 
importance of upholding traders' rights would demand a granting of concurrent rights. 
It is submitted, however, that despite the level of uncertainty arising from the actual and 
potential conflicts of the actions, a definitive pronouncement regarding the policy priorities to 
be followed would be unworkable. Individual assessments of each factual situation would be 
inhibited, and Parliament's intention as manifested in s 9 would be subverted. The problem 
may be demonstrated by considering whether there should be a defence allowing one's own 
name to be used in trade. If both parties have established goodwill, the issue would be one of 
concurrent rights. However if the defendant cannot establish goodwill, the issue would then 
be a question of balancing the concern to allow the honest use of one's own name with 
consumers' interests in restraining any misleading use. Here, a blanket position preferring 
passing off to s 9 may indeed stifle a rational development of the law rather than encouraging 
it. 
Rather than relieving judges of the necessity to artificially strain their reasoning, if a hierarchy 
of policy priorities was unable to meet the justice of the case, judges would then have to resort 
to strained reasoning when defining the traders' and consumers' relative interests. Therefore, 
as long as the two actions may be argued concurrently, a certain amount of uncertainty as to 
the direction of the law must be tolerated. 
4 Erosion of goodwill 
When a case arises in New Zealand in which a customer connection cannot be construed on 
the facts in the areas of pre-launch publicity and spill-over reputation, the courts will be faced 
with the issue of whether goodwill should be defined in terms of customer connection, or 
whether the threshold should be lowered to meet the threshold of s 9. If the New Zealand 
courts continue to define goodwill in terms of customer connection, either consumer interests 
would have to be artificially merged within the dominant rationale to maintain consistency 
between the actions, or passing off could become obsolete in these areas. 
It is, however, submitted that a reassessment of goodwill is required. As developments such 
as the Internet become even more widely accessible sources of information and advertising, 
the judicial adherence to the notion of customer connection must come under scrutiny. The 
judgments of Lord Diplock in Star lndustrialIOI and the AdvocaatI02 case are cited as 
authorities for the requirement of customer connection. However, as Lockhart J notes in 
ConAgra, 103 the cases wer_e not directly considering the question of the particular connection 
101 Above n 11. 
102 Above n 17. 
1 03 Above n 71 , 341. 
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required with the United Kingdom. Moreover, these judgments were given before the 
technology and communication explosion, and cannot provide the flexibility required in the 
modern commercial context. The harm traders can be exposed to in the global market place is 
no longer restricted to the "traditional diversion of custom situation",104 and so in this context 
it should be recognised that "[r]eputation is the key business facet that passing off 
protects" .1 os 
While upholding the importance of goodwill, Lord Diplock justified the extension of passing 
off in the Advocaatl 06 case by stating that it was "a case of unfair, not to say dishonest trading 
of a kind for which a rational system of law ought to provide a remedy to other traders ... "107 
This reasoning may be employed to challenge the very concept of goodwill upheld by Lord 
Diplock, on the basis that in situations where local traders unfairly trade under names which 
are associated with overseas traders in the minds of a significant section of the public, a 
remedy ought to be provided. The true policy imperatives of passing off should be 
acknowledged as preventing rivals in trade from misappropriating an established reputation, 
and the need to protect the public from deception.I os 
This view can be related to the relevance placed on fraudulent intent in the area of spill-over 
reputation, for "where there appeared to have been a clear attempt at appropriation or pre-
emption of the name or mark by a local trader", 109 courts have been ready to establish a lower 
burden of establishing goodwill.! 10 It is perhaps a flexible or loosened concept of passing off 
based on such a view that Spence envisages when suggesting that there "may be arguments of 
principle for expanding [passing off] into a more generalised tort of misrepresentation. "11 1 
Therefore, a substantial reputation alone should be sufficient without the requirement of 
consumer connection. Lowering the threshold in this way would make explicit what judges 
otherwise try to achieve within the traditional boundaries of passing off through the use of 
strained definitions of customer connection. The threshold of passing off would thereby be 
aligned with that of s 9 in the areas of spill-over reputation and pre-launch publicity, albeit 
framed within an altered passing off rhetoric. 
104 F Mostert and T Stevens "The Protection of Well-known Trade Marks on Non-wm:peting Goods" (1996) 7 
AIPJ 76, 86. 
105 Above n 71 , 340. 
106 Above n 102. 
107 Above n 102, 740. 
108 See J Jeremiah "Pathway Towards Recognition of International Reputation in Trade Marks" [1993] JBL 
391. 
109 Joi co Laboratories , above n 83. 
11 O For a discussion, see A Brown and A Grant 1he Law of Intellectual Propeny in New 'Zealand 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1989) 159. 
111 Spence, above n 94, 498. 
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F Conclusion 
As long as the policies of s 9 and passing off remain in conflict, the overlapping areas of 
protection may continue to develop according to ad hoe policy imperatives, giving little 
guidance when the actions conflict. The need to overcome the uncertainty between the actions 
is, however, arguably outweighed by the difficulty of making definitive policy decisions in the 
abstract, and the undesirability of a static framework of policy priorities which would negate 
any flexibility between the actions. While the policies underpinning the area of spill-over 
reputation and pre-launch publicity allow both trader and consumer interests to be addressed, 
the problem lies in New Zealand with the judicial reluctance to depart from the traditional 
insistence of a customer connection underlying goodwill. A more honest approach to the 
development of the tort should acknowledge the erosion of goodwill as a positive reform to 
meet the needs and conditions of modern business in the global market - needs which may 
otherwise be met through s 9. 
III TRADE MARKS, PASSING OFF AND SECTION 9 
A The Cumulative Approach 
1 Introduction 
Trade mark protection has its origins in the specialised form of action for 'unregistered trade 
marks' which co-existed with passing off.112 Plaintiffs faced the evidential burden of proving 
trade reputation in each case, however in 1875 the first trade mark legislation was enacted in 
the United Kingdom, allowing registered marks to provide proof of title.113 Passing off 
diverged from trade mark law at that point, becoming a cumulative, rather than alternative 
action, while trade marks became defined as property in themselves.114 
In New Zealand, a company, firm or individual name falls within the definition of a trade 
mark under the 'IMA, 115 and therefore may be registered as a mark if the requirements of the 
112 K Lupton "Trade Marks as Property" (1991) 2 IPJ 29, 30. 
113 The Trade Mark Registration Act 1875. For a discussion of the development of trade mark law see H R 
Mathys British Trade Mark Law and Practice: Repon of the Commission to examine British Trade Mark Law 
and Practice (Her Majesty ' s Stationery Office, London, 197 4) 2. 
114Trademarks are "incorporeal personal property"; see Lupton, above n 112, 29. 
115 The TMA, as amended in 1994 by section 2(3) of the Trade Marks Amendment Act 1994, defines a trade 
mark as "any sign or any combination of signs, capable of being represented graphically and capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another person." A sign includes "a device, 
brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral, colour or any combination thereof" 
[Emphasis added] 
20 
TMA are complied with. Passing off is available as a cumulative action,116 and s 9 has also 
been added as another protective head. As a result there is a complex interaction between the 
actions in the overlapping areas of protection. The relationship between s 9 and passing off 
has already been discussed, where to date, the interaction has not been developed along fully 
articulated lines. The interrelationship between the TMA, passing off and the FT A is even less 
articulated. The aim of this Part is to discuss whether there are conceptual difficulties with the 
cumulative operation of the actions, to highlight overlapping areas, and discuss whether a 
proprietary register for business names should be introduced as a means of rationalising the 
area of business names protection. 
2 Functions of trade mark law 
Trade marks have the double function of distinguishing the proprietor's goods or services in 
the marketplace, and indicating the source of goods or services by identifying them with the 
particular trader.117 In this way, trade marks benefit the proprietor and also reduce consumer 
search costs by providing consumers with the ability to choose between goods and services on 
a rational basis.1 1 s The trade mark regime promotes competition "by enabling traders to reap 
the reputation-related rewards"l 19 of their trade mark, and as the proprietor is encouraged to 
invest in quality, the risks faced by consumers are lowered.120 So, as an incentive for firms to 
maintain their reputation, the protection granted is potentially infinite.121 
3 Conceptual conflict? 
Trade marks differ from trade names in the sense that trade marks function to identify the 
source of goods or services, whereas trade names symbolise the business as a whole. 
However there is a functional overlap between them, as trade marks can also serve as an 
116 This is reflected in s 6 of the TMA which provides that the right to bring a passing off action is not 
affected by the Act. 
117 See a statement to this effect in Re Powell's Trade-mark [1893] 2 Ch 388,403 as per Bowen Ll; accepted 
in Kiwi Polish Co v Kempthome Prosser & Co [1925] NZLR 26. 
118 R H Folsom and L L Teply "Trademarked Generic Words" ( 1980) 89 Yale Ll 1323, 1337. 
119 p Culbert "Colour Alone as a Registered Trade Mark after the Trade Marks Amendment Act 1994: What 
Obstacles Remain?" (1996) 1(4) NZIPJ 84, 90. 
120 B Klein "Perfect Competition as a Criterion for Antitrust Policy: Brand Names, Entry Barriers and 
Exclusive Dealing in the Fisher & Paykel Case" in R J Ahdar (ed) Competition Law and Policy in New 
Zealand (Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1991) 65, 80. An argument made in Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr 
Investments Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332, 361 that a trade mark is a form of pernicious monopoly was described by 
Williams J as a "misnomer", as by giving the public a reliable indication of source, it facilitates responsible 
competition. 
121 If the protection had an expiry date beyond which anyone could use it, there would be little incentive to 
maintain the reputation. See Duncan, Economics of Intellectual Property" in Ministry of Commerce, above n 
1, 27. Section 29 provides that a trade mark may initially be registered for a period of 7 years, with 14 year 
periods thereafter, and unless there is a successful objection by a third party, it is conceivable that a trade mark 
may continue as long as the prescribed renewal fees are paid. 
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extension of the owner's trade name, carrying with it the reputation of the business.122 The 
TMA and passing off both address a trader's interest in protecting their goodwill by providing 
a means of dealing with misleadingly similar names or marks. The Ff A also intercepts with 
the trade mark regime in its concern to ensure that consumers are able to accurately identify the 
source of goods or services. Stemming from these functional overlaps are a number of 
commonalities. For example, the tests for establishing misrepresentation in passing off or 
misleading conduct under s 9 of the Ff A are closely related to the question of trade mark 
infringement.I 23 Also, in determining whether a mark that is not initially distinctive has 
acquired distinctiveness through use, essentially the same considerations are brought into 
account in common law proceedings as during the application to register.124 
Despite the functional overlaps between trade names and trade marks, the registration system 
is conceptually distinct from the rights existing at common law or under s 9. The 1MA is a 
permissive regime offering the advantages of proprietary protection upon registration which 
are not available under passing off or the FT A.I 25 In contrast to the relatively unpredictable 
and expensive actions of s 9 and passing off, the registered proprietor of a trade mark can rely 
on the clear evidence of ownership in infringement actions without the need to prove 
reputation or goodwill.126 And while injunctions for passing off ors 9 may be very localised, 
covering only the area where the plaintiff can establish goodwill or reputation, the 1MA 
confers national protection. Moreover, the trade marks register benefits potential users by 
providing a clear means of ascertaining whether a mark may be used, thus diminishing the 
number of unknowing infringements, and performing an important deterrent function.127 
From a conceptual point of view, then, the co-existence of the actions in the overlapping areas 
of protection is not inherently problematic. However, as a consequence of the limited 
monopoly granted to trade marks, there is a concern to constrain the types of words which 
may be registered, and the scope of the rights granted in terms of the goods and services they 
cover. Therefore, s 9 and passing off may be available when trade mark protection is not, 
when for example the name is unregistrable, registration is invalid,128 or there is a failure to 
122 KS Dueker "Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet Addresses" (1996) 9 
Harv J L & Tech 483, 490. 
123 Passing off and the FT A are assimilated to the 1MA in the sense that it is unnecessary to show fraud or 
intention to confuse, and similar factors are taken into account in assessing the likelihood of the confusing 
similarity of trade marks. For a summary of the rules for comparing words marks, see Levi Strauss , above n 
120, 362. See also New 'Zealand Breweries Ltd v Heineken [1964] NZLR 115, 133. 
124 Cornish, above n 96, 434. 
125 The trade mark system "offers advantages to those who register their trade marks, but imposes no penalty 
upon those who do not." TA Blanco White and R Jacob Kerly 's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (12ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 19$6) 356. 
126 See New Zealand Patent Office Trade Marks Registration (Government Print,Wellington, 1994) 6. 
127 In the absence of proprietary protection, barriers to the copying of trade marks are low. W A Landes and R 
A Posner "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective" (1989) 21 IPLR 229, 234. 
128SeeforexampleMontgomery v Thompson [1891] AC 217. 
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register for a wide enough specification of goods or services.! 29 A plaintiff may also rely on 
passing off or s 9 when a trade mark infringement remedy is not available, such as cases 
where the likelihood of deception is enhanced by the particular circumstances of use.130 
Due to the cumulative operation of the three actions, it can be observed that "the protection 
available for trade marks is considerable."131 As registration may be viewed as "a heightened 
form of protection for certain cases",132 there is "no necessary inconsistency between a 
finding of no infringement and a finding of passing off. .. "133 Because of the different scope 
of protection given, passing off and s 9 are able to address more diverse actions not 
specifically provided for the TMA, and are able to expand more quickly in line with "changing 
trading practices".134 In this way, passing off and s 9 can be viewed as performing a 
supplementary role. 
It may however be seen as ironic that protection can be granted by passing off or s 9 but not 
from the TMA, given that the purpose behind the introduction of the trade mark laws was 
largely to obviate the need to have to rely on the relatively expensive and cumbersome passing 
off litigation. These overlaps will be demonstrated by focusing on the protection of descriptive 
and geographic names, and the relevance of the fields of activity to the protection granted. 
B Differing Thresholds of Name Protection 
1 Descriptive or geographic names 
The register is currently divided into Part A and Part B. The threshold for Part A requires that 
marks are adapted to distinguish, and it is therefore difficult to register descriptive or 
geographic words or surnames.135 This reflects the concern to restrict the protection of words 
to those which other traders would not reasonably wish to use in relation to their own goods 
129J Karet "Passing Off and Trademarks: Confusing Times Ahead?" (1995) 17(1) EIPR 3. 
130 Ministry of Commerce, above n 1, l 65. There are cases where passing off has succeeded where a claim for 
trade mark infringement has failed. See for example Barberv Monico (1893) 10 RPC 93; see also Lee Kar 
Choo v Lee Lian Choon [1967] AC 602. 
131 Ministry of Commerce Rejonn of the Trade Marks Act 1953: Proposed Recommendations (Ministry of 
Commerce, Wellington, 1991) 3. 
132 Cornish, above n 96, 432. 
133 Lee Kar Choo, above n 130, 616. [Privy Council] 
134Mathys Committee, above n 113, 27 . 
135 Section 14( 1 )( d) of the TMA provides that a mark under Part A cannot directly describe the goods or 
services, nor consist of laudatory or geographical words, or surnames. The 'distinctiveness' required bys 14(2) 
has been interpreted as "apt to distinguish the applicant's goods [or services]"; Tarzan Trode Marie (1970] RPC 
450,456 as per Salmon Ll. While only (e) refers to distinctiveness, it is also regarded as an element of (a) to 
(d) by the courts: see Fanfold Ltd 's Application (1928) 45 RPC 199, 203. If a mark is not registrable under s 
14(l)(d) it still may be registrable under s 14(l)(e) on evidence of distinctiveness. 
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or services.136 Those refused registration under Part A may be accepted under Part B if the 
mark is capable of distinguishing the goods or services,137 although as the threshold for Part 
Bis lower, the protection granted is lesser than for Part A.138 Marks which are difficult to 
register may be accepted if a high degree of factual distinctiveness is established through use 
and reputation, and when assessing registrability, the criteria are analogous to those developed 
by the common law.139 
However, to be registered under either Part A or B, a mark must be inherently distinctive,140 
and if a mark does not have a minimum inherent capability of being distinguished in law, the 
mark will be unregistrable under either part despite 100 per cent factual distinctiveness.141 
One of the most common barriers to the registration of name trade marks is that the name is 
descriptive of the goods or services, either directly or in a laudatory manner.142 While the 
traditional reasoning for the requirement of inherent distinctiveness has been to prevent 
monopolies in words others may reasonably expect to use, it is difficult to see how a trader 
could reasonably expect to use a word which is distinctive of the applicant in fact. This has 
therefore led to the anomalous situation where these names cannot be registered, yet can be 
protected through passing off and Ff A actions anyway if secondary association has been 
established. This situation brings into question both the utility and certainty of the register. 
2 Common fields of activity 
In passing off or s 9 actions, there is no strict requirement for the parties to be involved in a 
common field of activity, and damages for passing off can include dilution of goodwill 
through incorrect association.I 43 As a result of the proprietary protection conferred by the 
TMA, there is a concern not to unduly restrict competition, and so names which comply with 
136 Above n 126. See also Lord MacNaghten's comment to this effect in Eastman Photographic Materials 
Company Ltdv Comptroller-General of Patents (1898) 15 RPC 476, 486. 
137 Section 15. In determining the issue of whether a mark is capable of distinguishing, the Commissioner 
will look at evidence of use of the mark, including evidence subsequent to the application. 
138 The two important distinctions between the registers are that i) pursuant to s 22, after seven years' 
registration, the validity of a Part A mark cannot be contested unless on grounds of fraud or the mark bas 
become deceptive; ii) s 9(2) provides that it is a defence to a trade mark infringement action of marks under Part 
B if the defendant can establish that the use of the mark of which the plaintiff complains is not likely to 
deceive or cause confusion or be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade between the goods and 
services or similar goods and services. 
139D R Shanahan Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off(2ed, Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 5. 
140 This may be defined as particulars which no person apart from the applicant could reasonably and honestly 
desire to use in relation to his or her own goods or services; above n 4. The inherent capacity to distinguish 
under Part B imports the same policy considerations as the "inherently adapted to distinguish" test for Part A. 
141 For example, in Crosfield & Sons Ltd's Application (1909) 26 RPC 837 the word 'perfection' used in 
relation to soap was held not to be inherently adapted to distinguish and therefore unregistrable, even though it 
had become identified with the applicant by the public. 
142 p Sumpter "How to Protect Your Business Name in the Modem Market-Place" (1993) 12 NZ Business 
Bulletin 94, 95. 
143 Above n 20. 
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the requirements for registration are then only eligible to be registered in respect of classes of 
goods or services.1 44 The scope of protection thereafter conferred upon registered marks is 
also based upon these categories, although it has recently been widened. Previously it was not 
an infringement to use the trade mark for goods or services falling outside the specification, 
even though the use could amount to passing off. However, as a result of amendments in 
1994, the TMA now prohibits the registration of marks that are identical or similar to a trade 
mark already registered in respect of the same goods; similar goods; and services that are 
similar to such goods where it would cause confusion or deception.! 45 A mirror provision is 
given for service marks.I 46 The infringing acts proscribed by the TMA have similarly been 
extended in 1994,147 
These provisions derive from the view that trade marks are "the embodiment of the producer's 
and the product's goodwill",148 and so they aim to uphold the function of trade marks as 
identifiers of source and quality. Passing off and s 9 on the other hand are able to extend 
protection to identical or similar names in relation to both dissimilar goods or services, 
offering the additional protection where the source doctrine does not necessarily apply, but 
where the dilution of the value of the name or mark can result from the use on non-competing 
goods or services. 
For the registered proprietors of well-known trade marks, greater protection is available under 
the TMA. Section 36(1) allows for the defensive registration of a well-known trade mark,149 
to prevent the possibility of another trader adopting the mark in relation to goods or services 
other than those for which the well-known mark is used or proposed to be used,150 This 
recognises the damage that traders can face through the dilution of the goodwill associated 
144 Section 7 of the TMA. 
145 Section 17(1). The rights given to a trade mark proprietor were extended to include rights against 
infringement of signs that are similar to the registered trade mark by the Trade Marks Amendment Act 1994, to 
comply with the GAIT: TRIPS agreement by the compliance date of 1 January 1995. See Trevor Rogers 
(1993) 544 NZPD 4769. 
146 Section 17(3) prohibits the registration of a mark in respect of the same services; similar services; or 
goods that are similar to such services if the mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion. 
147 Sections 8(1A) provides that a trade mark is infringed by the use of an identical sign in relation to any 
goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered; and a sign identical with it in relation to 
goods or services that are similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, if such use would be likely to 
cause confusion; and a similar sign used in relation to goods or services that are identical with or similar to any 
goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered, if such use would be likely to cause 
confusion, and in a manner as to render the use of the sign likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark; or 
importing a connection in the course of trade. 
148 A Kamperman Sanders "Some Frequently Asked Questions about the 1994 UK Trade Marks Act" ( 1995) 
17 EIPR 67, 69. See also A Kamperman Sanders and SM Maniatis "A Consumer Trade Mark, Protection 
Based On Origin and Quality" {1993] 11 EIPR 406. 
149 A defensive trade mark is one which has become so well known as respects any goods or services in respect 
of which it is registered, and in relation to which it has been used, that the use of it in relation to other goods 
or services would be likely to be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade with the person entitled 
to use the trade mark in relation to the first mentioned goods or services. 
150Aboven110, 56. 
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with the trade mark. Extensive evidence of reputation is required along with an onus to 
establish that the past use of the well known mark on goods or services would lead to a belief 
that its use on other goods or services is connected with the registered proprietor.151 As a 
result of these factors, there has been few such registrations in New Zealand.I 52 Also, the 
register was restricted to trade marks constituting an invented word or invented words. As part 
of the package of amendments in 1994, the restriction to invented words was removed, thus 
extending the availability of the register to all trade marks. However, the evidential burden of 
proving the necessary criteria remains. 
Further protection is available to the proprietors of well-known marks through s 16, which 
may be used to prevent the registration of a mark which would cause confusion with another 
mark.153 Also, since 1994, registered proprietors of well known marks have the enhanced 
protection provided bys 17(2) and (4))54 The proprietor's protection now includes the ability 
to prevent the registration of marks in New Zealand for use on dissimilar goods (or services) 
if it can be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade with the goods of the well-
known trade mark, and would be likely to prejudice the proprietor's interests where confusion 
or deception would be likely. Section 17(2) and (4) can be relied on by overseas proprietors 
who have not registered their marks in New Zealand but the mark is sufficiently well known 
in New Zealand,155 The provision therefore recognises that damage may be caused by the 
registration of a trade mark for use on non-competing goods, or non-competing services for 
service marks, including a perceived business connection which exposes the trade mark owner 
to the dilution of the "commercial magnetism" of the trade mark.1 56 However, the 
amendments do not provide general protection against dilution, as the registration of identical 
or similar marks cannot be prevented for both dissimilar goods and services. It is here that 
passing off and s 9 may provide supplementary protection. 
151 Above n llO, 57. 
152 Above n 131, 29. 
153 Above n 87. 
154 Section 17 (2) provides that no trade mark may be registered in respect of any goods if the trade mark is 
identical or similar to or a translation of a trade mark which is well known in New Z.ealand (whether through 
advertising or otherwise), as respects those goods or any similar goods; or as respects any other goods if use of 
the first mentioned trade mark would be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade between those 
other goods and the proprietor of the well-known trade mark, and would be likely to prejudice the interests of 
such proprietor where use of the trade mark would deceive or cause confusion. A mirror provision for services 
is contained within s 17(4). 
155 It had been argued that New Z.ealand' s law already gave protection to overseas marks through s 16 of the 
1MA, passing off and the 1MA, however s 17 (2) and ( 4) were enacted to comply with Article 6 bis of the Paris 
Convention, under which New Z.ealand is required to provide protection for trade marks of nationals of member 
states which have become well known here. This was extended to dissimilar goods or services to comply with 
GATT:TRIPS; see above n 131 , 28. 
156 For a discussion of the damage to well known marks, see Mostert and Stevens, above n 104, 76. 
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C Effects of the Proposed Trade Mark Reform 
I Introduction 
The proposed reforms to the trade mark regime contained within the Intellectual Property 
Reform Bill ("Bill") aim to more clearly establish the rights that can be obtained through trade 
mark registration,! 57 reduce the costs incurred in obtaining a trade mark, and harmonise the 
trade mark regime with overseas jurisdictions.158 Elmslie states that in the United Kingdom, 
the reforms of the Trade Marks Act 1994 ("UK Act") reflect a shift in the view of trade marks 
solely as indicators of source to being "valuable property rights in themselves".159 The regime 
has therefore been updated to take account of the changes in trade by conferring enhanced 
rights. The proposed trade mark scheme in New Zealand similarly aims to become a more 
accessible and desirable regime of protection. 
2 Distinctiveness 
An important change to be implemented in New Zealand will be the unification of Parts A and 
B as a means of speeding up the registration process, and reducing the administrative costs of 
registration.I 60 The proposed standard for distinctiveness is the more flexible 'capable of 
distinguishing' test presently applied in Part B, allowing each mark to be assessed on its 
merits.161 As a result, full protection will be afforded to marks previously only achieving the 
lower Part B registration.162 While it will still be difficult to prove the distinctiveness of some 
marks in the minds of the purchasing public, factually distinctive marks may be registrable 
even if they do not possess any inherent capacity to distinguish the applicant's goods and 
services. A mark will be prima facie registrable unless one of the stated grounds of objection 
apply,163 and so the presumption in tandem with the lowered threshold should make it easier 
for borderline marks to obtain registration.164 This will in effect create greater consistency 
between the thresholds of the TMA and the passing off and s 9 actions. 
157 The reforms will specify absolute grounds for refusal which arise from the nature of the mark itself, and 
relative grounds which arise from conflicts with other registered or unregistered marks. Above n 131, 3. 
158 The proposed reforms are part of the wider international reforms to comply with the GA TT: TRIPS 
agreement; above n 131, 3. The Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK) was in force 31 October 1994; and the Trade 
Marks Act 1995 (Australia) came into force 1 January 1996. The introduction of the Bill in New Zealand has, 
however, been delayed due to extensive consultation with Maori. 
159 M Elmslie "The New UK Trade Marks Bill" ( 1994) 16 EIPR 119. 
160 Above n 131, 3. 
161 Above n 131, 9. 
162 A Part A mark will no longer be automatically valid after seven years on the register, and the Part B 
defence will be abolished; above n 131, 27. 
163 Above n 131, 11. However, where an objection to an application is made, the burden of proof will be on 
the applicant to overcome the objection. Above n 131, 14. 
164 For a discussion of the parallel provisions in Australia, see J Luck "Distinctivess, Deception and 
Confusing Marks under the Trade Marks Act 1995" (1996) 7 AIPJ 97, 99. See also S Nicholson "The 
Australian Trade Marks Act 1995" (1995) 77 Trademark World 21. 
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Comishl65 observes that the cumulative relationship between common law and statutory 
rights coupled with the existence of a pre-grant examination have allowed the categories of 
registrable marks to be expanded, first by adding Part B to the trade marks regime to expedite 
the registration of "difficult" marks, and then to include service marks to render it unnecessary 
to prove passing off.I 66 The proposed lowered threshold may be viewed in context of this 
general development. However, while the proposed reforms have the effect of aligning the 
trade mark regime with passing off and s 9 rights, it seems that the reform is driven by other 
policy imperatives. The reports published by the Ministry of Commerce pay scant regard to 
the overlap of the actions, and it seems that the alignment will be merely incidental to the 
fundamental aim of reducing compliance costs for businesses and streamlining the registration 
system.167 
3 Common fields of operation 
While the scope of rights currently conferred under the 1MA will largely be retained, two 
points are noteworthy. Firstly, in 1991 the Ministry of Commerce reported that the defensive 
register would be abolished.I 68 This decision was based on the limited use of the defensive 
trade marks register coupled with the situation where the Commissioner is required, in effect, 
to decide infringement issues in advance. The Ministry considered that the dilution issues 
previously addressed by the defensive register would best be left to be decided in court 
through passing off and the Ff A, and the other mechanisms for protecting well-known marks 
under the TMA. Since the report, the defensive register was amended as indicated, in order to 
comply with the international obligations as an interim measure until the implementation of the 
main reforms. The defensive register may still be abolished, although the Ministry is still 
working through the issue.169 
Secondly, the decision has been made not to implement a general 'anti-dilution' provision for 
famous trade marks based on s 10(3) of the UK Act. Section 10(3) offers protection against 
the use of an identical or similar sign in connection with non-similar goods or services to those 
for which the mark is registered, where the reputation of the mark is such that the use of the 
sign would take unfair advantage of the reputation or would be detrimental to the reputation or 
165 Above n 96, 396. 
166 Above n 96,397 . Service marks came into force in New Zealand on 1 May 1988 as a result of the Trade 
Marks Amendment Act 1987. The New Zealand Industrial Property Advisory Committee in 1983 bad advised 
that the absence of a register of marks in the servicing industry did not assist in an orderly approach to the 
adoption of new marks which avoid conflict with the other marks; and that the proof and procedure required by 
passing off are more oneous th~n for trade mark infringement actions. New Zealand Industrial Property 
Advisory Committee Service Marks- Repon to the Minister of Justice, 1983. 
167 Conversation with Andrew Wierzbicki , Ministry of Commerce, 28 August 1996. 
168 Above n 131 , 29. 
169 This was ascertained from Andrew Wierzbicki, Ministry of Commerce, 25 September 1996. While the UK 
Act has abolished the defensive register, it has been retained by the Trade Marks Act 1995 in Australia. 
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the distinctive character of the trade mark.I 10 The provision therefore offers protection, also 
potentially available through passing off, where the 'source doctrine' does not apply, as the 
public does not have to be confused about the origin of the product or service.I 11 As a result 
of s 10(3) it has been observed that the UK Act will become more attractive in relation to 
passing off.I 72 
However, the Ministry of Commerce has indicated that a similar anti-dilution provision would 
"add unnecessary complexity and uncertainty to New Zealand law"I 73 by introducing 
"[u]nnecessary subtle distinctions", and would not add anything in practical terms to the 
protection available under passing off and s 9 of the FT A. Therefore, this decision, as with 
the indication that the defensive marks register may be abolished, reinforces the present 
system whereby s 9 and passing off perform a supplementary role to the TMA. While the 
threshold of protection will be more aligned with that under passing off and s 9, both the 1994 
amendments and the proposed reforms reinforce the differing levels of protection thereafter 
available. The issue therefore arises as to whether a separate business names register should 
be implemented as a means of addressing the overlapping areas of protection. 
D Proprietary Rights Regi.ster for Names used in Business 
An option raised by the Ministry of Commerce in its general review of industrial property 
rights was to establish a separate section of the TMA conferring proprietary rights to business 
names.I 74 The practical implications of such a register were not analysed, yet the Ministry 
was firm in its rejection of any separate protection for business names, concluding that they 
are adequately protected through the combined effect of passing off, s 9 and the TMA. 
Yet as discussed, there are substantive overlaps between the TMA, passing off and s 9, and a 
register conferring proprietary rights for business names could provide an opportunity to 
rationalise the whole area of name protection by providing one clear source of rights. Traders 
would be provided with the advantages of a proprietary regime such as clear evidence of rights 
as a means of deterring potential infringers, and low costs of enforcing the rights in the event 
of infringement. Businesses would be provided with a simplified means of choosing a name, 
and the marketplace decisions of consumers may be enhanced by a potential reduction in the 
use of confusingly similar names. 
170 Toe normal requirements for establishing the existence of goodwill in passing off will be useful in 
establishing whether a trader has required reputation for s 10(3); above n 148, 74. 
171 Above n 148. · 
172AMosawi "The Fine Line Between Trade Names" (1995) 145 (1) Newl.J 410, 411. 
173 Above n 131, 29. 
17 4 Above n 1, 222; see also Ministry of Commerce Reform of the Designs Act 1953 and Other Issues: 
Proposed Recommendations (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1992) 55. 
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A potential concern is that traders could hoard names in order to charge for assignments to 
those wishing to use the name, or to prevent others using the name and thereby stifling 
competition. However, these problems could be minimised in the same way as for trade 
marks, by providing that a name may be refused or removed if an application is made in bad 
faith, with removal after a specified period of non-use.175 Therefore, this problem alone 
would not override the potential benefits of a proprietary regime. However, a number of 
difficult issues remain. 
One issue is whether s 9 and passing off would remain as cumulative actions for business 
name protection. If they were retained, the problem of overlap would still remain, thus 
defeating the purpose of rationalising the whole area. However, if passing off and s 9 were 
denied to traders wishing to protect business names, the challenge would be to implement a 
regime that would both incorporate boundaries appropriately set to reflect the scope of the 
proprietary rights, while still providing the flexibility of passing off and s 9. An advantage of 
passing off and s 9 lies in their ability to adapt more easily to new circumstances, which will 
be of increasing importance with the rapid developments in technology and the expanding 
means of infringing rights in names.I 76 It must be questioned whether a statutory regime 
could provide such flexibility as developments, for example as presently seen in the area of 
domain names on the Internet, continually push the capabilities of the trade mark regime.! 77 
A number of matters would not be too problematic to implement while accommodating the 
objectives of the TMA, passing off and s 9. For example, provision could be made for 
circumstances in which the use of one's own name is legitimate,178 and for removal on the 
175 Presently, s 2 provides that use or a bona fide intention to use is a requirement for the filing of an 
application under the TMA. A trade mark may be removed from the register if there was no bona fide intention 
to use the mark and there has been no bona fide use in fact(s 35(1)(a)). Also, a trade mark may be removed if 
there has been no use for a continuous period of five years (s 35(1)(b)). Toe proposed reforms will abolish the 
requirement to make a statement of good faith on the application form but will allow for the refusal or 
invalidity of marks where applications are made in "bad faith". The period of non-use will be reduced to three 
years, with the onus of proof on the registered proprietor in an application to remove a mark for non-use. See 
above n 131, 20. 
176 Cornish has stated in relation to trade marks that " .. .it is easy under such a system for a trader's actual 
goodwill to outstrip the range of protection that he [or she] has acquired through registration." Above n 96, 
432. 
177 See for example C Harrisqn and S Frankel "The Internet: Can Intellectual Property Laws Cope?" (1996) 
1(3) NZIPJ 60. 
178 Section 12 of the TMA provides that no registration of a trade mark shall interfere with any bona fide use 
by a person of their name. Bona fide has been defined as "the honest use by a person of his own name without 
any intention to deceive anybody or without any intention to make use of the goodwill which has been acquired 
by another trader"; Baumer v Moore [1958) Ch 137, 147 as per Danckwerts J. 
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basis of genericism.119 Also, the interests of overseas traders and proprietors of well known 
marks could be addressed by incorporating provisions based on those in the TMA, but also 
including a wider 'anti-dilution' provision based on s 10(3) of the UK Act to cover the 
situations otherwise brought under s 9 or passing off. 
However, the national operation of a register would give rise to the problem of how to deal 
with identical or similar names which exist without confusion in different locations or different 
spheres of operation. One option would be to require registration in relation to specified 
categories of goods or services similarly to the TMA, and with similar limitations on the scope 
of protection. However, this is problematic because while trade marks function to indicate the 
source of goods or services, business names have the slightly different (though overlapping) 
function of representing the business as a whole, and therefore it may be argued that the 
'source doctrine' underpinning the trade marks regime should not be imported into a business 
names regime. This would undermine the flexibility presently provided by passing off and s 9 
actions which do not strictly require common activity and can provide protection for dissimilar 
or non-competing fields of operation. 
If a regime instead aimed to implement substantively the scope of protection provided by 
passing off and s 9, it would perhaps have to disallow the registration of any similar or 
identical name. This would necessitate an extensive system of ascertaining concurrent 
rights,1 so which would create substantial costs upon implementation. Also, the difficulty 
would be that while at present business names can be used concurrently without any conflict 
arising, if the concurrent registration of similar or identical names were only permitted after 
examination of the individual circumstances, parties would have to prove an absence of public 
confusion before being granted rights to use the name. 
Another issue is the threshold of protection for the business names register. Given that marks 
will be easier to register under the proposed reforms to the TMA, if a register separate from 
the TMA were to lower the threshold of registration, an even lower threshold would have to 
involve automatic registration with no need to establish distinctiveness. This would conflict 
with the public interest in restricting the private rights granted by proprietary protection, and 
the lowered thresholds of a business names system could raise the monopoly power granted, 
thus increasing entry barriers to competitors. However, if distinctiveness was required and a 
179 A concern common to the TMA, passing off and s 9 is to deprive words of protection when they have 
become ' generic', or merely descriptive; see for example Liebig 's F.xtract of Meat Co Ltd v Anderson (1886) 55 
LT 206. Section 24 of the TMA provides that where the whole mark comprises the generic word it is deemed 
to be an entry wrongly remaining on the register; and if part of the mark contains the generic word, the 
Commissioner may require the proprietor to disclaim any right to the exclusive use of the word. For a general 
discussion of the policy relati1:1g to generic words, see Duncan, above 121 , 29; Folsom and Teply above n 118. 
180 Section 17(5) of the TMA provides for the registration of identical or similar marks in cases of honest 
concurrent use, subject to conditions and limitations imposed by the Commissioner. A number of factors are 
balanced, such as the extent of use of the mark in time and quantity, the area of the trade; the degree of 
confusion likely to ensue from the resemblance of the marks; and the honesty of the use; see Pine 's 
Application (1933) 50 RPC 147, 159. 
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register was differentiated from the TMA in other substantive respects, the burden of 
collecting evidence to prove distinctiveness may be prohibitive to many entities. 
Another consideration would be the interaction with the company name regime. If business 
names (and names companies trade under which differ to the registered company name) are 
given proprietary rights, unless companies would be given the same rights, there would be the 
anomalous situation where business names may be conferred with proprietary rights under a 
special register, while companies trading under the company name would still have to rely on 
the TMA, passing off and s 9. Proprietary registration could exist in tandem with the 
Companies Register, as the latter does not endorse the use of a name, and so there would be 
no conceptual conflict in that sense. This, however, would defeat the purpose of rationalising 
the whole area of name protection into one source. Alternatively, if the Companies Register 
was abolished, a conceptual conflict could arise if applicants had to specify the classes of 
goods or services the name would be used in relation to, as companies no longer have to 
specify their objects on incorporation. Also, if the proprietary rights were determined on 
registration, there could be considerable problems of delay in incorporation. The delay could 
be addressed if registration was automatic provided a name was not similar or identical to a 
name on the register, but again, the public policy concerns would then arise. 
E Conclusion 
While the issues raised by the preceding discussion are not exhaustive, they serve to highlight 
some of the conceptual and practical problems involved in introducing a proprietary business 
names regime. Although the present cumulative system of protection contains a number of 
overlaps, in practical terms they do not justify the imposition of a system which would be 
likely to ere.ate more problems of implementation and maintenance than it would solve. 
Furthermore, the 1994 Trade Marks Amendment Act has enhanced the rights available under 
the TMA, and the proposed reforms of the Intellectual Property Law Reform Bill will align the 
threshold of protection with passing off and s 9 to a greater extent. For these reasons it is 
concluded that from a practical point of view, the cumulative operation of the trade mark 
registration system, s 9 and passing off should remain. 
IV COMPANY AND BUSINESS NAME REGISTRATION 
A Overview 
Under the Companies Act 1955 ("1955 Act") the Registrar's wide discretion to refuse names 
included those which were confusingly similar to a name already registered, giving protection 
to company names through the administrative procedure of name reservation. However this 
discretionary power has been reduced under the 1993 Act to the refusal of names which are 
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identical or almost identical to a name already registered. As a result there are greater 
possibilities for confusion, and inevitably, there must be a greater reliance on passing off and 
s 9 of the FT A to protect traders and consumers from misleadingly similar names. Business 
names have even less protection as there is no formal register for non-incorporated entities. 
Therefore a significant proportion of names have rights enforceable in court under passing off 
and s 9 through reputation or goodwill built up by use, yet which are less accessible to those 
seeking a simple means of adopting a non-infringing name. 
This Part will firstly examine whether the current level of protection is appropriate for 
company names, and then discuss whether a similar register for business names should be 
established as a measure both to provide traders with a simplified means of selecting a name, 
and to benefit consumers. 
B The Effect of Company Name Registration 
As an identifier, a company name is not only of financial importance to the company itself, but 
also benefits consumers by ensuring that they "know both that they are dealing with a limited 
company and know the identity of the particular limited company with which they are 
dealing."181 A name is therefore one of the four essential requirements of a company,182 and 
to be incorporated, a name must first be reserved. 
It seems that the effect of name reservation is commonly misunderstood as conferring 
intellectual property rights in a company name.I 83 Instead, it serves to identify the legal entity 
for the purposes of the Act, merely conferring an exclusive right to the name on the 
register, 184 and the right to prevent the incorporation of another company under an identical or 
almost identical name. Reservation does not constitute approval for use of the company 
name,185 and the use of a registered company name may still give rise to a trade mark 
infringement action,186 and passing off or s 9 actions brought by someone with a competing 
interest in the name.I 87 Nor does registration prevent a non-incorporated entity using the 
name, and an entity that is a company can use the name as an operating or trading name 
provided that it also uses its registered name on documentation as required by the Act.188 Any 
181 Jenicev Ihn [1993] BCLC 1349, 1352. 
182 Section 1 O of the Companies Act 1993. 
183 Ministry of Commerce (1992), above n 174, 54. See also above n 8, 174. 
184 Ministry of Commerce, above n 183. 
185 Above n 8, 171. 
186 Section 13 of the TMA provides that in an action for infringement of a trade mark it shall not of itself be a 
defence that the infringement arose from the use of the name under which a company has been registered. 
187 See for example Toyota Motors (Ltd) v The Registrar of Companies Umeported, 27 March 1979, Auckland 
Registry, M 439/77. See also FletcherChaUenge, above n 70. 
188 Department of Justice Companies Bill - Company Names (Submission to the Justice and Law Reform 
Committee, 1992) 5. 
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rights of use, then, arise independently of the Companies Act by establishing reputation or 
goodwill as the basis of s 9 or passing off actions, or by applying for proprietary rights under 
theTMA. 
C The Registrar's Discretion 
1 Scope of the discretion under the 1955 Act 
Although the rights conferred through company name registration are limited, companies 
under the 1955 Act were provided with a de facto "form of name protection."189 The principal 
ground available to the Registrar of Companies for rejecting a proposed name or directing a 
change of name was, that in the opinion of the Registrar, the company name in question was 
"undesirable".190 This term was interpreted to include confusing similarity between two 
names on the basis that while there may be no inherent property right in a name, any name 
likely to mislead or confuse the public should not be registered.191 The effect on the plaintiff 
was also a factor to consider, whether through financial detriment or inconvenience.I 92 
The 1955 Act also provided that an appeal could be brought against a decision of the Registrar 
to direct ( or not to direct) a company to change its name.193 Just as passing off principles have 
been imported into s 9 of the Ff A when determining misleading similarity between names, the 
courts exercising the discretion on appeal referred, albeit with "some caution "194 to passing 
off principles. For example, the reluctance to give rights to descriptive or geographic words in 
the absence of evidence of secondary association was also transferred to the cases dealing with 
confusing similarity under s 31.195 Other imported principles included the relevance of the 
189 Above n 188. 
190 Section 31(1)(a), as enacted bys 13 of the Companies Amendment Act (No2) 1983. Previously, s 31 
contained a number of matters for consideration such as whether the name was calculated to deceive within s 
31(1)(a), and whether it was undesirable within s 31(4). 
191 South Pacific Airlines of New Zealand Ltd v Registrar of Companies [1964] NZLR 1, 5. 
1 92 If the effect was inconvenience, the degree was a factor to be decided on the circumstances of the case; see 
Charisma Waterbeds Co Ltd v Registrar of Companies ( 1987) 3 NZCLC 96-131 . See also Pacific Life Ltd v 
First Pacific life Insurances (1988) 4 NZCLC 96-258. 
193 Pursuant to s 9B of the unamended 1955 Act, appeals could be made to the court within 21 days of a 
decision of the Registrar. Section 32(2) of the unamended 1955 Act gave the Registrar the power to direct a 
company to change its name within six weeks of the direction if the name was registered which contravened s 
31. On appeal, effectively the court's discretion was substituted for that of the Registrar and the matter dealt 
with de novo; see Abacus Finance Ltd v Registrar of Companies (1985] 2 NZLR 605. 
194 Charisma Waterbeds, above n 192, as per Williamson J. 
195 See Trade Consultants Ltd v Registrar of Companies (1986) 1 NZIPR 706 applying Office Cleaning, 
above n 34; Asia Pacific Trading Corporation Ltd v Registrar of Companies (1989) 4 NZCLC 96-318; and 
New Zealand Trophy Hunting Ltd v Registrar of Companies (1990) 5 NZCLC 96-380. 
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relative spheres of the companies' activities in assessing the probability of confusion;l96 the 
significance of evidence of actual confusion; 197 and the relevant section of the public, with 
reference to the specialist nature of the goods and services and the ability of customers to 
diff erentiate.19 s 
Companies were therefore able to prevent another company registering a similar name without 
the expense of bringing a passing off action, or having to establish each of the criteria 
demanded by passing off,199 yet with a level of certainty afforded when establishing 
confusing similarity. The exercise of the discretion created a functional overlap with passing 
off and s 9, as it pre-empted disputes that may have resulted in litigation. This overlap was 
however removed by the company law reform process. 
2 Company law reform 
During the overhaul of the 1955 Act, the process of authorising name reservation came under 
scrutiny. The need was identified to speed up the process of incorporation by reducing 
administrative delay, increasing the certainty of applications, and decreasing the resources 
spent by the Registrar.200 The Registrar's discretion was therefore reduced to address these 
problems,201 and now only applies to a name the use of which would contravene an 
enactment, which is identical or almost identical to an already reserved name,202 or in the 
opinion of the Registrar is offensive. Similar names are now acceptable for registration 
purposes, and the onus has been placed on the applicant to ensure that there is no confusing 
similarity with a registered name at the point of registration. The function of determining rights 
to use names has therefore been placed solely with the judiciary under the law of passing off 
and s 9.203 
196For example, in First National Brokers Ltd v Registrar of Companies (1986) 3 NZCLC 96-119, 98-867 it 
was material that the rival companies were "operating in almost identical spheres in some of their activities and 
somewhat parallel spheres in the remainder of their activities." Similarly to passing off, this was not always 
conclusive, as it was still necessary to show the use of a similar name was likely to cause confusion. 
197 For example, in Asia Pacific, above n 195 , the absence of actual confusion weighed against the application 
for a name change of a rival company. 
198 New 'Zealand Trophy Hunting , above n 195. 
199 Above n 194, 99-926. 
200 New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Preliminary Paper No 5 (Wellington, 1987) 17. See also 
New Zealand Law Commission Company Law Rejomz and Restatement: Repon no 9 (Wellington, 1989) 19. 
201 Section 22(2) of the 1993 Act, and section 32(2) of the 1955 Act as amended by the 1993 Act. 
202 For guidelines the Registrar of Companies follows when determining whether a name is identical or almost 
identical to another, see Fligh't Centre (NZ) Ltd v Registrar of Companies (1994) 7 NZCLC 96-651; see also N 
Harris "Registrar's Notes" (1995) 5 CSLB 62. 
203 During the debate of the Companies Bill 1990, the Hon Doug Graham stated that "company names that 
cause confusion will cease to be a matter for the Registrar of Companies but will be a matter for the respective 
companies to litigate." (1993) 533 NZPD 13353. 
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In Flight Centre (NZ) Ltd,204 an attempt was made to argue that as the Registrar must not 
reserve a name "the use of which would contravene an enactment",205 the FfA came within 
the scope of the section, and the Registrar would therefore have to have regard to s 13(f) of 
the Ff A206 when making decisions as to registrability. However Blanchard J concluded that 
Parliament's intention was to confine the role of the Registrar in the name reservation process, 
and the words were restricted to enactments which specifically prohibit or restrict the use of a 
name.207 
If accepted, the argument would have circumvented the removal of the Registrar's wide 
discretion by requiring the Registrar to have regard to deceptive similarity under s 9 of the 
Ff A.2os The case therefore confirms that aggrieved companies must now rely on the remedies 
of passing off or a breach of the Ff A to prevent another company using a similar name. To 
avoid infringement actions after registration and use of a name, companies must ensure that 
the name chosen is not misleadingly similar to another business or company name, does not 
damage the goodwill or cause likely damage to the goodwill of another name, or infringe 
existing or pending trade marks.209 
Initially, the Law Commission also recommended that the Registrar should have a right to 
issue cessation notices to companies if the Registrar believed on reasonable grounds that the 
continued registration of a name was undesirable.210 If implemented, the recommendation 
would have provided companies with the residual right to object once a confusingly similar 
name had been registered. That specific recommendation was later abandoned by the Law 
Commission to reflect the policy of restricting the Registrar's discretion.2 11 The provision 
204 Flight Centre, above n 202. 
205 Section 22(2)(a) of the 1993 Act, and s 32(2)(a) of the amended 1955 Act. 
206 Section I3(f) provides that no person shall, in trade, in connection with the supply or possible supply of 
goods or services with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods or services, falsely represent 
that a person has any sponsorship, approval, endorsement, or affiliation. 
207 For example, the Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act 1981. 
208 Above n 204, 260-615. Blanchard J agreed with the Registrar's submission that to uphold the appellant's 
argument would create considerable difficulties for the Registrar's office as "in many instances the Registrar 
would simply not have the information necessary to discharge such a function", and would slow the reservation 
process down. It was noted that to determine breaches of the Ff A, "the Registrar would often have to call for 
evidence and might be in the position of having to give parties affected by his decision the opportunity of a 
hearing". 
209 Letters sent to applicants by the Registrar of Companies when reserving the applicant's name warn the 
applicant that they are responsible for ensuring the name does not conflict with rights arising under the TMA, 
the FT A or at common law. 
210 Section 20( 1) of the Law Commission's Draft Companies Act provided that the Registrar could serve a 
cessation notice if the Registrar believed on reasonable grounds that a) a name should not have been registered; 
orb) continued registration ot the name is undesirable. See Law Commission (1989), above n 200,200. 
211New Zealand Law Commission Company Law Rejonn: Transition and Revision - Repon No 16 
(Wellington, 1990) 157. The Law Commission restricted its recommendation to when registration was not 
sought in good faith or when a name should not initially have been registered. The reference to good faith was, 
however, dropped in law reform process. 
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finally enacted gives the Registrar a new power to direct a company to change its name and 
select a new name,212 however it is limited to situations where the Registrar believes on 
reasonable grounds that the name should not have initially been reserved. 
3 The corresporuiing position in Australia 
These changes to the company name regime parallel those introduced in Australia, and have 
therefore been supported by the Steering Committee of ANZ-CERT A "as a harmonising move 
which will enhance the common commercial environment. "213 Previously, a name was 
unavailable if it closely resembled a name which was already registered,214 however in 1991 
the subjective test was removed by the Corporations and Securities Law.215 Similarly to the 
New Zealand position, the responsibility for avoiding confusingly similarity with registered 
names is placed with the company, and the TPA and passing off have therefore increased in 
importance. To reduce the possibility of confusion between companies, the concept of the 
Australian Company Number has been introduced, whereby the number given to a company 
upon incorporation is required to be used on a company's seal, public documents and 
negotiable instruments.216 
4 Assessing the reform 
In Sika (NZ) Ltd, 211 Tompkins J stated that the role of the Registrar under the 1955 Act 
concerned the "effective administration of the Act" and was therefore "an administrative rather 
than a judicial or quasi-judicial function." This view may however be contrasted to that held 
by those involved in the law reform process. The Department of Justice was of the opinion 
that the Registrar "in effect determines property rights in the use of company names",218 
presumably referring to the way that conferring exclusive rights of registration may then 
enable one company to build up goodwill in a name through use. The Department of Justice 
212 Section 24(2). Previously, if a change of name direction was not complied with, the Registrar could only 
prosecute to enforce; see A Beck, P Foley, D Goddard, D Jones, and M McDonald (eds) Morison 's Company 
and Securities Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1994) C305. 
213 Steering Committee of Officials The Harmonisation of Australian and New 'Zealand Business Law: Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement - Repon to Governments (July, 1992) 6. 
214 Section 38 of the Companies Act 1981 . 
215 Pursuant to s 367, the three circumstances when a name is unavailable are 1) when it is already reserved or 
registered 2) when it is a name which appears on the national business names register 3) when the name is one 
which has been declared by the regulations to be unacceptable for registration. For a discussion of the reforms, 
see R Webb "Names" in RP Austin, HA J Ford, A B Greenwood, AG Hartnell, PG Hely, J RF Lehane, 
Justice B H McPherson and J B Shanahan (eds) Australian Corporation Law: Principles and Practice - Vol 2 
(Butterworths, Sydney, 1991) 42-101. 
216 Section 219. Section 372 provides that the company name may comprise its number, in which case its 
name deed not be reserved (s 120(2)). See generally J Story An Overview of Australian Company Law and 
Practice (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 1991) 14. 
217 Sika (NZ) Ltd v Sika Technology Ltd ( 1991) 5 NZCLC 96-470, 67-156. 
218 Above n 188, 4. 
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then submitted that similar names should be excluded from the Registrar's discretion. While 
recognising the potentially increased costs for parties that could result, it was argued that the 
cost argument is outweighed by the inappropriateness of allowing the Registrar to continue 
with the "judicial role".219 
A company name can now be reserved within 24 hours, and so from the perspective of 
reducing the delays of incorporation the reforms of the 1993 Act must be seen as a success. 
Furthermore, from a harmonisation perspective, the system has the advantage of being 
substantially aligned to the Australian system. However, from a cost perspective, a more 
favourable regime for companies would be that initially recommended by the Law 
Commission in 1989 which incorporated a right to object to registered names on the basis of 
undesirability. It would recognise the importance of minimising administrative delay by only 
refusing identical names at the initial registration stage. However it would also give companies 
a cost effective method of resolving disputes with other companies, and by relying on 
objections after registration, less strain would be placed on official resources than under the 
1955 system. 
The Law Commission's recommendation for the residual right of objection was based on the 
conclusion that "there is a substantial demand for and a public interest in name protection and 
in avoiding names that are confusing or otherwise undesirable".220 A system incorporating 
the right of objection would not only benefit the companies, but also would benefit consumers 
in the same way that they benefit through the actions brought by "ethical traders" under the 
FTA. The pre-existing case law under the 1955 Act could provide the basis for decisions, and 
would ensure that important principles, such as those relating to descriptive names and the 
relative fields of activity, would continue to apply. Continued consistency with the general law 
could be ensured by including an appeal process to the High Court. 
A system similar to the regime thus envisaged operates in the United Kingdom, where the 
removal of the subjective test has been tempered by a system allowing companies to object to 
names once registered.221 A company cannot be registered by a name which is the same as a 
name appearing in the registrar's index of company names.222 Yet for 12 months after 
incorporation,223 the Secretary of State can order a company to change its name if the name is 
219 Above n 189. 
220 Law Commission (1989), above n 200, 87. 
221 Previously, no company could register a name which was "undesirable"; s 17 of the Companies Act 1948. 
The Registrar usually made a search of the Register and the Trade Marks Register, and refused to consent if 
there was likely to be confusion. The subjective test was removed by s 22 of the Companies Act 1981, due to 
delays in name approval and the policy of reducing public expenditure. See J H Farrar, N E Furey and B M 
HanniganFarrar's Company Law (3ed, Butterworths, London, 1991). 
222 Section 26(l)(c) of the Companies Act 1985 (UK). Guidelines as to whether one name is the same as 
another are contained ins 26(3). 
223 The 12 month period is inclusive of the time taken by the secretary to come to a decision; above n 172, 
410. 
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the same as, or in the opinion of the Secretary of State too like, a name on the index of names 
- a power usually exercised in response to an objection.224 
It is, however, acknowledged that introducing a residual system of objection is highly 
unlikely, given the policy of separating company names from other issues in name protection 
such as trade mark infringement and prior rights built up by use. Instead, the company name 
regime is viewed purely as a means of identifying the legal entities incorporated. The official 
responsibility for protecting both companies and consumers from the negative consequences 
of confusingly similar names has been eschewed, limiting the obligation of the Companies 
Office to avoiding identical or almost identical names. Any consumer deception or disputes 
over the right to use a company name are left for the relevant parties to remedy in court, as 
was demonstrated by Magellan. 22s 
D Business Names Protection 
1 Present position in New Zealand 
While the protection of company names has decreased under the 1993 Act, there is, as a 
minimum, the assurance that a name which is identical or almost identical to a registered 
company name will not be accepted for reservation. The Register also serves the important 
public function of making company information available to the public. However, in New 
Zealand there is no equivalent register for names used by non-incorporated business entities. 
As a result, there is a large group of names used in trade and with rights enforceable in court, 
which can only be found through informal means such as trade journals or telephone 
directories. The issue therefore arises as to whether a register should be introduced for non-
incorporated entities (and companies trading under names which differ from their registered 
names), as a means of providing a complete register of prior rights in conjunction with the 
Companies Register and the TMA. 
2 Australian model 
In Australia, the 'uniform' business names registers226 at State (or Territory) level prohibit a 
person carrying on business in a State (or Territory) unless the business name consists of the 
224 Section 28(2). Relevant considerations to the issue of whether two names are "too alike" include the 
geographical area of a business conducted by the companies, any evidence of confusion between them, and a 
visual and phonetic examination of the names to assess the likelihood of public confusion. See Mosawi, above 
n 172,410. If a company does not comply with the direction, it is liable on summary conviction to a fine, and 
on conviction after continued contravention, to a daily default fine (s28(5)). 
225 Above n 28. 
226 See Business Names Ordinance 1963 (A.C.T.); Business Names Act 1962 (Victoria); Business Names Act 
1962 (Qld); Business Names Act 1963 (S.A.); Business Names Act 1962 (W.A.); Business Names Act 1962 
(Tas.). As a matter of convenience, this paper will refer to the provisions of the Business Names Act 1962 
(NSW) ("BNA"). 
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name of that person without any addition; if a company carries on business under the 
company's name; or if the business name is registered under the Act.227 The main object of 
the uniform legislation is to protect the public by identifying those not carrying on business 
under their own name,228 and thereafter regulating the use and disclosure of the business 
name.229 
A subsidiary consideration is to avoid public confusion by disallowing the registration of 
identical or deceptively similar names, and in this way there is a minimum level of protection 
through registration of a name.230 Similarly to company name reservation, however, rights 
granted are incidental. Moreover, registration cannot be used as a defence to a passing off 
action,231 an action pursuant to s 52 of the TPA232 or immunity against an action for 
infringement of a registered trade mark.233 The only effect of registration, then, is that the 
registrant does not commit an offence against the relevant legislation if it carries on business 
under the name.234 
3 Shou/,d New Zea/,and adopt a business names register? 
Establishing a business names register would not require any substantive change to New 
Zealand's intellectual property law, as the rights conferred under a register would be both 
minimal and incidental. It would, however, provide both a source of information for 
consumers, and a simplified and potentially low risk means for prospective businesses and 
companies to select a name by providing a cross-searching registration facility. As a result of 
the abolition of the business names register in England in 1981,235 it has been noted that 
selecting a new business name "is a more hazardous procedure than it used to be".236 
A business names register could provide exclusive rights to the registration of the name or an 
almost identical name. The benefits to traders would also be enhanced if a system incorporated 
a right of objection to continued registration of a name on the basis of confusing similarity, for 
227 Section 5 of the Business Names Act 1962 (NSW). 
228 Above n 5, 3. 
229 Section 20 of the BNA regulates the use and exhibition of business names. 
230 Webb, above n 215, 42-106. 
231 Franconi Holdings Pty Ltd v Gunning (1982) I SR 341 (WA). 
232 Aspar Autobam Cooperative Society Ltd v Dovala Pty Ltd ( 1986) ATPR 40-727, 4 7-939. 
233 See for example B M Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Budget Rent-A-Car Systems Pty Ltd ( 1977) 51 ALlR 254. 
234 See for example Nauru Local Government Council v Australian Shipping Officer's Association (1978) 
ATPR 40-087. 
235 The register, established by the Registration of Business Names Act 1916, was abolished by the 
Companies Act 1981 and replaced with the consumer oriented Business Names Act 1985 which merely 
regulates the display of business names and the supply of information to customers or suppliers. 
236 A J Boyle (ed) Gore-Brown on Companies (44ed, Jordan & Son Ltd, Bristol, 1991) 2.005. The fact that a 
business name is the same as, or similar to, another business name will not be an infringement of s 2 of the 
Business Names Act 1985. 
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the reasons discussed in relation to the companies regime. Another consideration is that if 
there is a move towards greater ease of company registration between New Zealand and 
Australia, business names legislation may have to be considered as a harmonising move given 
that in Australia the companies register is cross-referenced with the business names 
register.237 
The Consultative Committee examining tax simplification in New Zealand has suggested that 
the government evaluate the use of a business names register, taking into account the tax 
simplification advantages.23 s This was based on the view that in seeking name protection, 
many taxpayers have registered companies because there is no business names register, 
therefore facing unnecessary compliance costs.239 The Committee's conclusion on this point 
should be treated warily, given the level of misconception about the effect of company name 
reservation. It is unclear whether the taxpayers chose to form companies out of a mistaken 
believe that company name reservation gave greater rights than would in fact be gained, and 
whether they would choose to take on the extra administrative burden if the extent of the rights 
were fully known. However if the Registrar's discretion under the 1955 was seen as an 
incentive, the report is clearly of less relevance since the 1993 Act. If a system allowing the 
Registrar to make cessation notices for undesirable names was to be adopted under the 1993 
Act, the report would then have more weight, as the incorporated form would again be of 
some advantage in relation to name protection. 
The Ministry of Commerce has focused on the NSW business names register as a possible 
model for New Zealand,240 but concluded that the disadvantages of a separate business names 
register would outweigh the advantages. It was considered that the present cumulative regime 
of name protection is adequate,241 and potential users of business names are able to 
"adequately locate existing business names through existing sources" such as trade journals. 
These conclusions were reinforced in 1994.242 
Among the disadvantages cited by the Ministry is the potential for abuse through the hoarding 
or pirating of names. This problem can result from a 'first in first served' basis of registration, 
237 Story, above n 216, 17. Whenever a new company name is sought to be reserved, the Australian Securities 
Commission has regard to both existing company names and the National Business Names Register to 
determine name availability. See Webb, above n 215, 42-106. The Steering Committee noted that if a 
simplified registration system between New l.ealand and Australia was established, then the effect of the 
business names legislation would need to be considered, although at this stage it is not proposed to have a 
common name registration system; above n 213. 
238 Tax Simplification Consultative Committee Final Repon of the Consultative Committee (September, 
1990) 103. 
239 See also New Zealand Law Commission ( 1987), above n 200, 17. 
240 Above n 1, 218. See also Ministry of Commerce (1992), above n 174. 
241 Ministry of Commerce (1992), above n 174, 56. 
242 Ministry of Commerce Intellectual Propeny Law Rejonn Bill - Maori Consultation Paper (Ministry of 
Commerce, Wellington, 1994) 37. 
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with no account taken of prior use of the name or trade mark registration.243 It was as a result 
of these problems that the United Kingdom abolished their business names register.244 
Recommendations were also made in Australia to follow the United Kingdom's example in 
abolishing the system of business names registration, with new legislation to cover disclosure 
requirements for businesses.245 Following public opposition, the system was not 
abolished.246 
Presently, some protection from piracy in New Zealand derives from the fact that company 
registration does not prevent another non-incorporated entity using the name, and also another 
company can use the name in trade as long as they use their registered name as required by the 
Act. There would be an increased potential for hoarding if a business names register was 
cross-referenced with the Companies Register, as all trading names would have to be 
registered, and they could not be identical or almost identical to a name on either register. 
Despite this concern, the problem of hoarding is not an insurmountable barrier to establishing 
a business names register in New Zealand. Limiting the Registrar's discretion to refuse the 
registration of names which are identical to those on both the Companies Register and the 
business names register would minimise the problem, as the victims of pirates or hoarders 
would still have the option of registering a similar name.247 Any residual concerns could be 
addressed by, for example, imposing a condition of good faith registration or providing that 
an application could be made to expunge the name after a period of non-use or if bad faith is 
demonstrated.248 Moreover, it must be remembered that registration does not guarantee rights 
of use, and the possibility of passing off, FT A or trade mark infringement actions remain if 
the name is then used in trade. 
Another factor cited by the Ministry as militating against the establishment of a register was the 
difficulty of preventing the perception that a register implied proprietary rights to the name, or 
rights of exclusive use.249 This consideration is not a persuasive argument for rejecting a 
243 Ricketson, above n 89, 805; citing the Industrial Property Advisory Committee Repon on the Registration 
of Service Marks under the Trade Marks Act 1955 and the Protection of Company and Business Names ( 1981) 
15 ("IPAC report"). 
244 Above n 1, 221. See also above n 241. 
245 Ricketson, above n 243, 806. A Task Force set up to review the NSW register also recommended that it be 
abolished; see NSW Corporate Affairs Commission Discussion Paper: Proposed Deregulation of Business 
Names Legislation ; cited in H H Ednie, HA J Ford and WE Paterson (eds) Butterwonhs Company Law 
Bulletin no 5 (Butterworths, North Ryde, 1986) 84. 
246 See for example R Webb Butterwonhs Company Law Bulletin No 13 (Butterworths, North Ryde, 1989) 
192. 
247 When considering the probl~m of hoarding, the IPAC report argued that allowing similar names to be 
registered would enable those with legitimate claims to register a name similar to their own, thus lessening the 
problem. Above n 243. 
248 The IP AC report concluded that one option to overcome the problem of hoarding was to improve the 
opposition procedures for business and company registers; above n 243. 
249 Above n 241. 
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register, given that there are misconceptions about company name reservation, and it is not 
suggested that the company names register be abolished. Rather than being a matter which 
itself overrides the benefits of an index, the danger of creating misconceptions is a matter to be 
considered when implementing the new regime and explaining to the users the rights and 
obligations created thereunder. 
More persuasive, however, are the administrative costs involved in establishing and 
maintaining a register, and keeping it free from unused marks. If a system incorporated a right 
of objection to similar names or names registered in bad faith, these costs would increase. 
There would also be a significant problem with enforcing compliance. While company name 
reservation is an initial step in the statutory process of incorporation, a business names register 
would have to rely on a system whereby penalties were imposed for non-registration. A 
register could only be useful if full compliance could be guaranteed, as partial compliance 
would defeat the aim of establishing a complete register of rights. The effectiveness of a 
system enforcing compliance would therefore be crucial. 
One option to deal with the problem of non-registration would be to remove the existing prior 
rights of the businesses and companies which do not register their trading name. This option 
would, however, be undesirable, as the fundamental right to protect a name in court could be 
removed as a result of ignorance of the system and its implications upon non-registration. The 
Mathys Committee in the United Kingdom examined this issue when considering whether 
there should be an 'official list of unregistered trade marks'2so to facilitate the selection of new 
marks. The Committee recommended against such a register, as any practical procedure for 
encouraging or forcing inclusion on such as list would "be at the expense of those very 
benefits which all concerned wish to retain",251 and there was no convincing reason for 
"detracting from this right of redress to compel the users of unregistered trade marks to enter 
those marks on a list." Similarly it may be argued that the importance of the right to bring 
actions for protecting business names, and especially those not registered as trade marks, is 
such that the potential removal of the rights as a means of negatively enforcing compliance of a 
register cannot be justified. 
A second option would be to adopt a penalty system based on the NSW scheme whereby fines 
are imposed for non-compliance.2s2 These fines could be justified on the basis of consumer 
protection and as an attempt to achieve full compliance which ultimately benefits the business 
community. It would still be very difficult to achieve full compliance by a system which relies 
on negative motivation for registration in contrast, for example, to the companies regime 
where companies can only be incorporated once a name has been reserved. Further, if 
complete compliance is a goal, then the resources required to police such a system in contrast 
250 Above n 134, 35. 
251 Above n 134, 36. 
252 Carrying on business under an umegistered business name could incur a fine of A$200 under the BNA, but 
the Business Names (Amendment) Act 1989 increased the amount to A$5,000. 
to the system of company incorporation may be considerable. 
4 Conclusion 
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Ultimately, the problems of maintaining a register and enforcing compliance may lead to the 
conclusion that while the absence of a complete register of rights creates a risk for commercial 
entities when they adopt a name, the present risk does not arguably justify the administrative 
burden. As the Mathys Committed has observed in relation to trade marks, 
... many businesses find circumstances arise which call for relatively quick action and so they take 
what precautionary steps they can and then go ahead accepting an element of risk; ... we can only 
assume that in the majority of cases they find the risk was justified and the limited precautionary 
steps adequate. 
It has already been discussed how the Companies Act 1993 places an increased risk on those 
registering a name, which has resulted from the policy decision to reduce the discretion of the 
Registrar and the resources spent by the Companies Office. In light of this, it is not surprising 
that the Ministry of Commerce has concluded that the risk of adopting names is something that 
must be borne in the wider interests of economic and administrative expediency. Indeed, the 
problems of enforcing compliance and keeping the register free from unused marks are 
significant. However, it is submitted that the Ministry of Commerce was too quick to dismiss 
the option, focusing on the administrative difficulties and the potential problem of hoarding 
without examining possible solutions. Given the benefits of a register to potential traders, 
existing businesses, and consumers, it is submitted that the implementation of a register in 
New Zealand deserves further examination. 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper began with the proposition that words, as part of a wider conception of a ' common 
heritage', are excluded from the limited monopoly protection of copyright. However, separate 
policy imperatives have led to the protection of the exclusivity of commercial names under the 
cumulative and overlapping heads of passing off, s 9 and the TMA. While each provides an 
avenue for name protection and on that level serve the same general purpose, each confers 
protection on closely defined terms, and so they are also potentially in conflict. 
As a result of the differing policy priorities of s 9 and passing off, actual and potential 
conflicts have arisen in the substantive law and its future development. This was demonstrated 
by discussing the implications of s 9 for the areas of concurrent use, the 'own name' defence, 
and for the development of passing off in the areas of spill-over reputation and pre-launch 
publicity. Secondly, while there is no conceptual conflict between the trade mark registration 
system and the prior rights accumulated through reputation or goodwill, the cumulative 
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operation of the heads of protection has created the situation whereby names may be protected 
through litigation although they do not meet the 1MA' s threshold of protection; and litigation 
may provide protection where none is available through infringement actions. This overlap 
was discussed with reference to the protection of descriptive and geographic words; and the 
ability of s 9 and passing off to extend protection to marks in circumstances where identical or 
similar marks are used on similar or dissimilar goods or services. 
In each Part it was considered whether the present framework of the cumulative legal avenues 
should be reformed in order to solve the conflicts, yet it was concluded that it is preferable to 
maintain the current framework. Reform is only desirable if it is able to solve more problems 
than it creates, and in both Parts it was concluded that a generalised protective head could not. 
Firstly it was considered whether a general tort of misappropriation should be adopted in place 
of both passing off and s 9. This could potentially remove the need for judges to employ 
artificial reasoning to ostensibly maintain the boundaries of each action while implicitly 
implementing a conflicting policy objective. However it was concluded that in the area of 
business name protection an 'umbrella' tort would simply transfer the same issues to another 
framework, and as the scope of protection available under passing off and s 9 is adequate, the 
imposition of an overarching tort of uncertain scope is not sufficiently justified. 
In circumstances such as concurrent use where the differing JX)licy priorities directly conflict, 
some uncertainty is preferable to attempts to imJX>se a fixed hierarchy of policy priorities as a 
guide to the implementation of the actions. This would negate judicial flexibility in meeting the 
justice of the case. In the areas of spill-over reputation and pre-launch publicity, however, it is 
argued that reform of passing off is desirable by removing its artificial requirement of 
customer connection, and thus aligning the thresholds of the actions in these areas. A more 
honest recognition should be made by the New Zealand courts that the underlying purpose of 
passing off is to protect traders against misrepresentations resulting in consumer deception. 
This may become inevitable as s 9 places pressure on passing off either to 'move with the 
times' in line with commercial expectations, or become obsolete. 
In Part III it was then concluded that an attempt to rationalise the whole area of business and 
company name protection by implementing a single proprietary register would be fraught with 
conceptual and practical difficulties. Moreover, the proJX>sed trade mark reforms will have the 
effect of aligning the thresholds of protection to a greater extent by removing the requirement 
that a mark be inherently distinctive before it can be registered. While s 9 and passing off may 
be seen as threatening the carefully established boundaries of protection thereafter conferred 
by the TMA, at a practical level passing off and s 9 perform a supplementary role, and thus 
enhance the protection available to commercial entities. This interaction has been implicitly 
endorsed by the Ministry of Commerce, as the proJX>sed reforms acknowledge the ability of 
passing off and s 9 to provide flexibility and wider scope than the TMA. 
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While it is therefore concluded that the practical operation of the cumulative heads of 
protection does not demand change on a broad level, two recommendations are made to 
enhance the practical operation of the cumulative system of protection. Firstly, it is argued that 
a system be implemented within the 1993 Act whereby companies can object to a name at the 
post-registration stage on the basis of undesirability. The speed of incorporation would not 
thereby be compromised, and while a functional overlap with passing off and s 9 would be 
reintroduced, it would serve only to pre-empt litigation which may otherwise result. 
Companies would benefit by having a cost-effective means of resolving disputes at the 
administrative level, and consumers would also benefit. 
Secondly, it is submitted that the option of establishing a business names index was too 
readily dismissed by the Ministry of Commerce. A result of the cumulative approach to name 
protection is that a trader contemplating a new name has no complete or simplified register of 
prior rights to consult, and while there are indeed significant administrative problems to be 
addressed, a register has the potential to enhance the system from the perspective of both 
commercial entities and the consuming public. Furthermore, if greater harmonisation between 
New Zealand and Australia in the area of company registration is considered, a business 
names register may have to be reassessed. 
Company names have been divorced from other prior rights to names, functioning under the 
1993 Act simply to ensure the identification of companies for the purposes of the Act. 
Underpinned by the policy of fiscal restraint, the reform indicates that both these 
recommendations conflict with the current governmental policy. Yet if the goal of enhancing 
the practical operation of the present system of name protection is instead prioritised, the two 
areas indicated should be revisited. 
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